衛星廣泛的廣播覆蓋特性使其容易受到竊聽攻擊。在5G的不同潛在多址接入候選者中，非正交多址(Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA))是主要競爭者之一。在非正交多址，來自不同終端用戶(User Terminal (UT))的訊號被獨立編碼和調變，然後在傳輸前進行訊號疊加，接收端利用連續干擾消除(Successive Interference Cancellation (SIC))的方法來獲取用戶終端的訊息，但是，SIC的進行會帶來額外的安全威脅。本文討論了傳統SIC所面臨的威脅，並提出了一種能夠容忍衛星地面網絡中通道狀態資訊(Channel State Information (CSI))快速變化和無法獲得瞬時通道狀態資訊的安全方法，並且可以與其他物理層安全方法互相結合。;Satellite′s wide broadcasting coverage property make it is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. Among the different potential multiple access candidates for 5G, Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) is one of the main contenders. In Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access, signals from different user termianls (UTs) are independently coded and modulated, and then superposition before transmission, and the receiver uses the principle of Successive Interference Cancellation (SIC) to obtain UT information. However, the implementation of SIC leads to additional threats. This paper discusses the threat of conventional SIC and proposes an security method that can tolerate the rapid changes of channel state information (CSI) and the inability to obtain instantaneous CSI in satellite terrestrial networks, and can be combined with other physical layer security methods.
