English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文筆數/總筆數 : 81570/81570 (100%)
造訪人次 : 47012262      線上人數 : 105
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜尋範圍 查詢小技巧:
  • 您可在西文檢索詞彙前後加上"雙引號",以獲取較精準的檢索結果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜尋,建議至進階搜尋限定作者欄位,可獲得較完整資料
  • 進階搜尋


    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/96251


    題名: 關於企業環境社會責任的三項議題
    作者: 張家榮;Zhang, Jia-Rong
    貢獻者: 產業經濟研究所
    關鍵詞: 企業環境社會責任;Environment Corporate Social Responsibility
    日期: 2024-12-26
    上傳時間: 2025-04-09 17:29:10 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 國立中央大學
    摘要: 企業社會責任的風潮在近年愈趨興盛,追求利潤不再只是企業經營的唯一目標,環境保護、勞工人權、消費者權益等議題愈發受到重視。本文研究目的在於分析當廠商具有友善環境的經營目標時,其對社會福利以及市場均衡會產生何種影響,分別從政府汙染稅政策、廠商技術授權策略以及市場結構等三個面向加以討論。
    首先考量政府課徵的汙染稅為外生決定且ECSR廠商獨占時,汙染防治邊際成本提高則廠商利潤有可能增加;邊際汙染損害愈大在廠商關心環境程度夠高下,反使汙染程度減輕。進一步分析汙染稅為內生決定時,關心環境程度愈高則汙染稅率愈低有益其自身利潤,但無助於改善環境品質與社會福利。若是在雙占市場下愈強烈的友善環境動機同樣無法改善環境,且因為整體汙染防治支出增加造成福利惡化。
    其次,擁有先進生產技術的領導廠商具有友善環境動機時,若採固定權利金授權方式,當廠商關心自身環境汙染程度愈高時,其授權後利潤可能增加,最終均衡結果亦可能發生市場失靈現象。若採單位權利金授權方式,當邊際汙染損害較大且廠商較不在意整體產業汙染水準時,會收取較成本差距小的權利金,且此時固定權利金策略可能優於單位權利金策略,惟福利變動方向未定。
    最後,在短期寡占情形下,若產品生產的邊際汙染損害較嚴重時,廠商的友善環境行為的確有益於改善環境品質與社會福利;但當長期下利潤極大廠商自由進出市場時,關心環境動機愈強烈只會造成其虧損愈嚴重且無法減輕汙染,社會福利反而隨之惡化。若是邊際損害愈高,本國政府將有動機調降關稅以鼓勵外國廠商多生產,此時國內環境品質有可能因此改善。
    ;ECSR (Environment Corporate Social Responsibility) has been a hot issue in recent years. In this article, we will discuss this issue from three different aspects.
    First, if the ECSR firm is a monopoly in the industry, facing the pollution tax determined exogenously, the rise of pollution abatement investment cost may increase its profit. If the ECSR firm has great concern about the environment, then larger marginal damage may reduce pollution. If the pollution tax is determined endogenously, the monopolistic ECSR firm with greater concern about the environment will gain higher profit due to a lower pollution tax, but environment quality and social welfare remain unchanged. If the firms in a duopoly market structure face the same situation, the same behavior will worsen social welfare due to higher pollution abatement investment expenditure.
    Secondly, if an ECSR firm owns cost-reducing innovation, its licensing behaviors will differ from normal firms. Considering the fixed-fee strategy, the ECSR firm with greater concern about the environment may gain higher profit and is more likely to improve social welfare. Considering the royalty strategy, the ECSR firm may charge a royalty that is smaller than the cost gap. Unlike normal firms, the fixed-fee strategy may be superior to the royalty strategy.
    Lastly, under endogenous market structure, more eco-friendly behaviors, like greater concern about the environment or a larger number of ECSR firms, can’t reduce pollution; instead, worsen welfare. If marginal damage becomes larger, the government tends to lower tariff rate to encourage foreign firm to produce more, then may result in better environment quality.
    顯示於類別:[產業經濟研究所] 博碩士論文

    文件中的檔案:

    檔案 描述 大小格式瀏覽次數
    index.html0KbHTML16檢視/開啟


    在NCUIR中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.

    社群 sharing

    ::: Copyright National Central University. | 國立中央大學圖書館版權所有 | 收藏本站 | 設為首頁 | 最佳瀏覽畫面: 1024*768 | 建站日期:8-24-2009 :::
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 隱私權政策聲明