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Item 987654321/99936
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https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/99936
題名:
Maintenance outsourcing coordination with risk-averse contractors
作者:
曾富祥
;
Tseng, Fu-Shiang
;
Yeh, Yingchieh
貢獻者:
管理學院工業管理研究所
關鍵詞:
Business and Management
;
Channel coordination
;
Contract incentives
;
Contractors
;
Decision making
;
Design
;
Failure
;
General Paper
;
General Papers
;
maintenance contract
;
Maintenance contracts
;
Maintenance costs
;
Maintenance management
;
Management
;
Manufacturers
;
Manufacturing
;
Manufacturing processes
;
Operations research
;
Operations Research/Decision Theory
;
Outsourcing
;
Preventive maintenance
;
Profits
;
Repair & maintenance
;
Risk aversion
;
Risk preferences
;
Studies
;
Supply chain management
日期:
2014-11-25
上傳時間:
2026-04-21 13:41:59 (UTC+8)
出版者:
Taylor and Francis Ltd.;London: Taylor & Francis
摘要:
摘要: Under a maintenance outsourcing contract, an external contractor receives a fixed payment from a manufacturer for periodically performing preventive maintenance and for performing minimal repairs whenever process failures occur. If the contractor's maintenance policy results in a process uptime above a target level specified in the contract, the contractor receives a bonus payment based on the difference between the uptime and the target levels. We study the optimal designs of maintenance outsourcing contracts for achieving channel coordination when the contractor is risk averse towards uncertain repair costs caused by process failures. We find cases in which channel coordination cannot be achieved because of the contractor's risk preference. Furthermore, the contractor's risk preference may make channel coordination more difficult or easier, depending on the parameters considered in the model.
其他題名: J Oper Res Soc
出版者: London: Taylor & Francis
出版日期: 2014-11-01
出處: The Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2014-11, Vol.65 (11), p.1760-1769
資源來源: ABI/INFORM Collection
版權: Copyright © 2013, Operational Research Society Ltd. 2013
版權: Copyright © 2014 Operational Research Society Ltd
版權: Operational Research Society Ltd. 2013
識別號: ISSN: 0160-5682
識別號: EISSN: 1476-9360
識別號: DOI: 10.1057/jors.2013.143
識別號: CODEN: OPRQAK
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[工業管理研究所 ] 期刊論文
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