銀行業高階經理人激勵薪酬與績效表現之關聯

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姓名

陳文玲(Wen-Ling Chen) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

財務金融學系在職專班

論文名稱

銀行業高階經理人激勵薪酬與績效表現之關聯
(The Relationships between Performance and Executive Salary in Taiwanese Banking Sector)

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摘要(中)

本研究在探討銀行業高階經理人激勵薪酬與績效表現之關係。實證分析係以2005年至2010年臺灣證券交易所掛牌上市、櫃之商業銀行與上市、櫃金融控股公司之子商業銀行，共計26家商業銀行為研究對象，檢驗其高階經理人之薪酬資料，探討銀行業實施激勵薪酬與公司績效表現以及營運風險之影響。
實證結果顯示，「有實施激勵薪酬」者，其資產報酬率（ROA）及稅前息前盈餘（EBIT）均較「無實施激勵薪酬」者為高，代表其在經營績效方面確實表現較佳，證實代理理論觀點。另外，「有實施激勵薪酬」者，其逾放比率較「無實施激勵薪酬」者為低，而其無擔保放款增加，顯示高階經理人為了達到經營績效，產生道德危機，大量增加信用放款，使營運風險提高。
實施不同激勵制度之實證結果顯示，「實施股票激勵制度」者，其資產報酬率及稅前息前盈餘均大於「實施選擇權激勵制度」者，即實施股票激勵制度與經營績效呈現正相關。另外，「實施股票激勵制度」者，其逾放比率較「實施選擇權激勵制度」者小，而其無擔保放款反而提高，營運風險增加。
在股價績效方面，「實施股票激勵制度」者，其個股股價績效與市場大盤相比較，有超額報酬；「實施選擇權激勵制度」者，其股價績效較差，股價報酬並未優於市場大盤。

摘要(英)

This research aims to study the inter-relationships between the incentive salaried pays and the performance results of the senior executives in Taiwan’’s banking industry. Practical research targets on a total of 26 banks, either as commercial banks, or as banking arms for their parent financial holding companies, their stocks either listed on or trading over-the-counter at Taipei Stock Exchange. The researcher analyzed the senior executives’’ salary data, and studied the impacts as well as management effectiveness and operating risks of the banks that implemented incentive programs between the years 2005 and 2010.
The results of the research show that the banks having implemented incentive programs enjoy both higher Returns on Assets (ROA) and Earnings Before Income Tax (EBIT) than those proving nothing of the sort. This apparently reflects a fact that these incentive programs have paid off favorably to the banks’’ management effectiveness, and also proves the validness of the viewpoints of the "agent theory". In addition, the researcher also finds that while the former banks bill lower NPL (Non-Performance Loan) ratios than the latter, there have been considerable non-collateralized loans added to their overall loan portfolios, thus deteriorated their asset quality and exposured their operating risks, a moral crisis that the
senior executives, in order to pocket more incentive pays and to beautify the management effectiveness, have substantially uplifted the credit loans.
Meanwhile, the research also reveals another fact that different incentive programs will lead to the different results; the banks that implemented "incentive programs with giveaways of stocks" have harvested higher both ROA and EBIT than those that provide "incentive programs with giveaway of options". That means the stocks as incentives have paid off proportionally to the level of management effectiveness. However, while those banks providing stocks as incentives have lower NPL ratios than those with options as incentives, the former have more non-collateralized loans in their portfolios, an albert truth that their asset quality worsened and operating risks jumped.
From the perspective of the stock prices vis-a-vis the market, better performers are those banks that gave the stocks as incentives than those offering the options. Obviously, the former banks enjoy the exceed returns in the stock prices, while the latter are losers in comparison.

關鍵字(中)

★ 營運風險
★ 經營績效
★ 薪酬結構
★ 激勵薪酬

關鍵字(英)

★ operating risks
★ Incentive pays
★ salary structure
★ management effectiveness

論文目次

中文摘要 …………………………………………………………………… I
英文摘要 ……………………………………………………………………II
目錄 …………………………………………………………………………IV
表目錄 ……………………………………………………………………… V
第壹章緒論………………………………………………………………… 1
第一節研究動機……………………………………………………… 1
第二節研究目的……………………………………………………… 2
第三節研究架構……………………………………………………… 3
第貳章文獻探討…………………………………………………………… 4
第一節代理理論……………………………………………………… 4
第二節高階經理人薪酬型態………………………………………… 5
第三節高階經理人激勵薪酬與績效表現…………………………… 6
第參章研究方法…………………………………………………………… 9
第一節樣本資料……………………………………………………… 9
第二節變數定義……………………………………………………… 9
第三節研究方法………………………………………………………10
第肆章實證結果……………………………………………………………12
第一節敘述性統計分析………………………………………………12
第二節實證結果分析…………………………………………………14
第伍章結論…………………………………………………………………19
第一節研究發現………………………………………………………19
第二節研究限制………………………………………………………20
參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………………21

參考文獻

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指導教授

徐政義(Cheng-Yi Hsu)

審核日期

2012-6-19

推文