| 摘要(中) |
本文發現在不同參試者稟賦分配和錄取名額組合下會造成參試者競爭程度不同,因此不同類型參試者在不同組合下最適努力程度不同。
也因為參試者稟賦分配跟錄取名額組合的差異,當試題鑑別度降低時不一定讓參試者減少最適努力程度,我們發有可能參試者最適努力程度會隨試題鑑別度下降而增加的情況。
當廠商給錄取和未錄取獎勵值時多考慮錄取者為何種稟賦類型的機率時,稟賦較佳者預期效用會減少但稟賦較差者預期效用會增加;兩類型參試者最適努力程度皆減少。
當錄取名額增加時在不同稟賦分配及廠商評價下,不同類型參試者預期效用及最適努力程度變化會有差異,但錄取名額增加會使得稟賦較差者均衡時最適努力程度比稟賦較佳者來的高。
在比較靜態分析上,參試者稟賦分配、錄取名額或廠商評價對結果不具影響力,在其他條件不變下當稟賦較佳者稟賦增加,所有參試者預期效用和最適努力程度會隨著稟賦較佳者稟賦增加而增加;當稟較賦差者稟賦增加,所有參試者預期效用和最適努力程度會隨著稟賦較差者稟賦增加而減少;當參試者風險趨避程度增加,所有參試者預期效用和最適努力程度會隨著參試者風險趨避程度增加而增加;當或參試者努力的邊際成本增加,所有參試者預期效用及最適努力程度會隨著參試者努力的邊際成本增加而減少。
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| 摘要(英) |
In this article we found that different examinees’’ ability distribution and admission quota combinations will lead different competition between different type competitors, so different type examinees will choose different efforts in equilibrium. Besides when item discrimination decrease will not always reduce examinees’’ efforts, it just depends on the examinees’’ ability distribution and admission quota combinations.
When naive firm becomes smart firm the higher ability examinees will reduce their expected utility, but lower ability examinees will increase their expected utility. However both type examinees will reduce their efforts in the equilibrium.
When admission quota increase different type examinees will choose different actions in different ability distribution, but lower ability examinees will always choose higher efforts than higher ability examinees.
In comparative static analysis we found that examinees’’ ability distribution, admission quota, and firm’’s evaluation do not change the result. In all cases, when higher ability examinees’’ ability and examinees’’ risk averse index increase will cause both type examinees increase their expected utility and efforts in equilibrium.
When lower ability examinees’’ ability and examinees’’ marginal cost of effort increase will cause both type examinees decrees their expected utility and efforts in equilibrium.
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| 參考文獻 |
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