最佳定價當面對實施廣告策略的風險偏好投資客

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姓名

唐英峰(Ying-feng Tang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

工業管理研究所

論文名稱

最佳定價當面對實施廣告策略的風險偏好投資客
(Optimal pricing when facing a risk-taking speculator with advertising strategy)

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摘要(中)

我們研究了壟斷企業在房地產時，面臨著投機者的公司賣一個固定的產能。該公司設置了一個價格需求的不確定性之前得到解決。投機者可能進入市場，並打算單純轉售，可盈利的，如果需求比原來要高。我們還發現，投機者沒有風險中立，賣方不會關閉投機者退出市場。此外，我們添加一個廣告策略在論文中和增加利潤在銷售商和投機者。消費者可戰略選擇何時購買，他們也可以選擇購買公司或投機者。
有三種結果。首先，存在投機者增加了企業的預期利潤，即使零售市場競爭的公司。二，賣方將增加利潤時面臨投機者與廣告策略在動態定價時。三，賣方將獲得較少的利潤面臨的風險規避投機者。另一方面，賣方將獲得更多的利潤時面臨的風險愛好傾向的投機者，總體利潤（賣方和投機者的利潤）也將逐漸增加。

摘要(英)

We study a monopolist firm of real estate when facing a speculator’’s firm selling a fixed capacity. The firm sets a price before demand uncertainty is resolved. Speculators may enter the market purely with the intention of resale, which can be profitable if demand turns out to be high. We also find out that speculator is not risk-neutral, seller will not shut speculator out of the market. Furthermore, we add an advertising strategy in the paper and increase profits of seller and speculator. Consumers may strategically choose when to purchase, and they may also choose to purchase from the firm or from the speculator.
There are three findings. First, the presence of speculators increases the firm’s expected profits even though the resale market competes with the firm. Second, Seller will increase profit when facing speculator with advertising strategy in dynamic pricing. Third, seller will earn less profit when facing risk-aversion speculator. On the other hand, seller will earn more profit when facing risk-prone speculator, the overall profits (seller and speculator’’s profit) will also increase gradually.

關鍵字(中)

★ 風險規避
★ 風險喜好
★ 投機者
★ 廣告策略
★ 需求的不確定性

關鍵字(英)

★ advertising strategy
★ demand uncertainty
★ Speculator
★ risk-prone
★ risk-aversion

論文目次

Contents
中文摘要......................................................................................................................... i
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... ii
Contents ....................................................................................................................... iii
The contents of figures………………………………………………………………...v
The contents of tables…………………………………………………………………vi
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Motivation and background ................................................................................... 1
1.2 Research objectives ................................................................................................ 2
2. Literature review ........................................................................................................ 5
2.1 Demand uncertainty and strategic consumer ......................................................... 6
2.2 Speculator .............................................................................................................. 7
2.3 Advertising ............................................................................................................. 8
2.4 Risk effect .............................................................................................................. 9
3. Model ....................................................................................................................... 10
3.1 Fixed pricing strategy .......................................................................................... 12
3.1.1 Resale Market ................................................................................................. 12
3.1.2 Primary Market ............................................................................................... 13
3.2 Dynamic Pricing Strategies.................................................................................. 15
3.2.1 Dynamic Pricing Without Speculators ............................................................ 16
3.2.2 Dynamic Pricing With Speculators ................................................................. 17
4. Pricing strategy with risk-taking speculator ............................................................ 18
4.1 Risk effect of fix pricing strategy ...…………………………………………….21
4.2 Risk effect of dynamic pricing strategy ...………………………………….......22
5 Advertisement strategy with speculator .................................................................... 23
6.Numerical analysis .................................................................................................... 26
6.1 Fixed-pricing ........................................................................................................ 26
6.2 Dynamic pricing................................................................................................... 28
6.3 Pricing with risk-taking speculator ...................................................................... 29
6.3.1 Fix pricing with risk-taking speculator ........................................................... 30
6.3.2 Dynamic pricing with risk-taking speculator .................................................. 31
6.3.3 Seller do not know that speculator is risk-preference ..................................... 32
6.3.4 When proportion of strategy consumers is more and more decreasing,speculator will be more risk prone ................................................................. 34
6.4 Advertisement strategy with speculator ............................................................... 34
6.4.1 Speculator's profit with advertisement strategy .............................................. 35
6.4.2 Seller know that advertisement make increase utility of consumers .............. 36
6.4.3 When seller face a risk-taking speculator with advertisement strategy .......... 37
7.Sensitivity analysis.................................................................................................... 38
7.1 Risk- coefficient (c) will change .......................................................................... 38
7.2 Advertisement- coefficient (k1) will change ........................................................ 43
8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 45
References .................................................................................................................... 47

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指導教授

曾富祥(Fu-shiang Tseng)

審核日期

2011-7-12

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