董事會特徵、所有權結構與超額現金持有價值關係之研究—中國上市公司之實證

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孫芳瑜(Fang-yu Sun) 查詢紙本館藏

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論文名稱

董事會特徵、所有權結構與超額現金持有價值關係之研究—中國上市公司之實證
(The relationship between board characterictics, ownership structure and the value of corporate excess cash holdings：Evidence from China listed)

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摘要(中)

本文主要探討董事會特徵對於公司超額現金持有價值的影響，並加入所有權結構的調節，藉以了解董事會特徵在不同所有權結構下，對公司超額現金持有價值的影響。本研究以2003年至2010年中國上市公司共11008個觀察值，進行實證分析。實證結果顯示，董事會規模擴大有利於公司超額現金持有價值的提升；獨立董事比例增加與董事長兼任總經理，則會使公司超額現金持有價值下降。其次，加入所有權結構變數後，發現國有所有權持股比例越高，越能掌控董事會，導致監督制衡能力下降，超額現金持有價值降低；國有所有權持股比例增加對獨立董事比例和公司持有超額現金價值關係之影響並不明顯；董事長兼任總經理則會削弱董事會監督效能，然而當私有所有權與國有所有權持股比例相當時，反而會使公司超額現金持有價值提升。最後，在股權分置改革影響上，實證結果顯示股權分置改革後，公司治理機制的提升使得代理問題下降，公司超額現金持有價值上升。但國有所有權的改革，在超額現金價值上仍不具成效。

摘要(英)

This reaserch examines the relationship between board characteristics and the value of corporate excess cash holdings as well as the impact of ownership structure on this relationship. The sample contains the listed firms in China from 2003 to 2010 and obtains 11008 firm-year observations. The empirical results indicate that a larger board size may increase the value of corporate excess cash holdings. On the other hand, a higher percentage of independent directors in board and duality would decrease the value of corporate excess cash holdings. Moreover, when taking ownership structure into account, we find the higher the shares owned by the government, the lower the value of corporate excess cash holdings;. An increased state ownership does not influence the relationship between independent director proportion in board and the value of corporate excess cash holdings; Duality decreaces the monitoring function of the board, however, when the percentage of shares owned by government is close to that of private ownership, the value of corporate excess cash holdings increases. Finally, we further investigate the effects of Split Share Reform. The empirical results show that the improvement of corporate governance mitigates the agency problem, however, the reform of government ownership has little effect on the value of corporate excess cash holdings.

關鍵字(中)

★ 現金持有價值
★ 中國
★ 超額現金
★ 所有權結構
★ 董事會特徵

關鍵字(英)

★ Ownership structure
★ Board charactoristics
★ China
★ Value of cash holdings
★ Excess cash

論文目次

目錄
頁次
中文摘要　　……………….…………………………………………………………………i
英文摘要……………………..….….…………………………………………………………ii
目錄…………………………….……………………………………………………………..iii
表目錄……………………..……………………………………………………………….…iv
一、緒論………………………………………………………………………………………1
二、文獻探討與研究假說……………………………………………………………………5
2-1、董事會特徵與超額現金持有價值關係…………………..………………………..5
2-2、所有權結構在董事會特徵與超額現金持有價值間之調節效果..………………..8
2-3、股權分置改革對所有權結構與超額現金持有價值關係之影響…….…..………11
三、研究方法…………………………………………………………………………………14
3-1、資料來源及樣本………………………..………………………………………… 14
3-2、模型建立………………..…………….……………………………………………15
3-3、變數定義……………………………………………………………………………16
3-4、統計方法……………………………………………………………………………20
四、實證結果與分析………………………………………………………………………….22
4-1、基本敘述性統計分析………………………………………………..…………….22
4-2、多變量分析結果…………………………..……………………………………….26
4-3、穩健性分析……………………………………………..………………………….41
五、結論與建議………………………………………………………..…………………….63
5-1、研究結論與管理意涵………………………………………………..…………….63
5-2、研究建議與限制……………………………………..…………………………….64
參考文獻………………………………………..…………………………………………….65

參考文獻

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指導教授

洪榮華、林翠蓉
(Jung-hua Hung、Tsui-jung Lin)

審核日期

2012-6-25

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