股權結構與投資現金流量敏感度之關係

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姓名

張育慈(Yu-ci Zhang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

股權結構與投資現金流量敏感度之關係
(The relationship between ownership structure and investment cash flow sensitivity)

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摘要(中)

股權結構集中的國家較容易產生控制股東與少數股東的核心代理問題，而控制股東持股集中會帶來兩個效果，分別是侵占效果與誘因效果，本研究主要是探討股權集中的侵占效果與誘因效果對投資現金流量敏感度的影響，研究結果顯示控制股東的現金流量權與控制權偏離得越嚴重，即侵占效果越嚴重，其投資現金流量敏感度越高;而控制股東現金流量權越大，即誘因效果越強，則投資現金流量敏感度則越低。此外，還發現控制權大於30%的研究樣本，投資現金流量敏感度越高。

摘要(英)

It is easier for countries with concentrated ownership structure to produce the core agency problem of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. When the controlling shareholder holds a high degree of ownership may cause two effects, the entrenchment effect and the incentive effect. The aim of this study is to examine the sensitivity between the entrenchment effect and the effect of incentives and investment cash flow. The result of this research has shown that when the control rights over shareholders overwhelm the cash flow rights. On the other hand, when cash flow rights overwhelm the control rights, the incentive effect becomes greater and the sensitivity of the cash flow. In addition, when control rights account over more than 30%, the sensitivity of investment cash flow increase.

關鍵字(中)

★ 侵占效果
★ 誘因效果
★ 投資現金流量敏感度

關鍵字(英)

★ the investment cash flow sensitivity
★ the entrenchment effect
★ the incentive effect

論文目次

目錄
中文摘要 i
Abstract ii
致謝 iii
目錄 iv
圖表目錄 v
第一章緒論 1
第二章文獻探討 4
第一節股權結構與代理問題 4
第二節投資現金流量敏感度 7
第三章假說發展 10
第四章研究方法 14
第一節樣本選取、研究期間與資料來源 14
第二節迴歸模型 14
第三節變數說明 15
第五章實證結果與分析 21
第一節樣本敘述統計 21
第二節迴歸模型之結果 25
第六章結論 37
參考文獻 39
圖表目錄
圖一最終控制者對A、B公司之控制流程圖 19
圖二最終控制者對A、B、C公司之控制流程圖 20
圖三控制權與投資現金流量敏感度 35
圖四現金流量權與投資現金流量敏感度 36
表一樣本分配表 22
表二敘述統計表 23
表三 Pearson相關係數矩陣 24
表四股權集中之侵占效果與投資現金流量敏感度的關係 28
表五股權集中之誘因效果與投資現金流量敏感度的關係 30
表六盈餘偏離比與投資現金流量敏感度的關係 32
表七現金流量權與投資現金流量敏感度的關係 34

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指導教授

曹壽民(Shou-min Tsao)

審核日期

2012-7-8

推文