財務壓力、公司治理對CEO誘因薪酬與盈餘管理之影響：真實與應計盈餘管理

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郭柏顯(Bo-sian Guo) 查詢紙本館藏

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財務壓力、公司治理對CEO誘因薪酬與盈餘管理之影響：真實與應計盈餘管理
(Financial Pressure，Corporate Governance，The Impact of Earnings Management and CEO Incentive Pay：Real and Accruals Earnings Management)

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摘要(中)

本文檢視在企業面臨財務壓力時，執行長之誘因薪酬(Incen-tive Pay)與盈餘管理(Earnings Management)之關係，並且考慮公司治理(Coporate Governance)情況之相關性。使用2003年到2007年美國公司為樣本，共1061筆觀察資料，其中有財務壓力(Financial Pressure)或盈餘壓力(Earnings Pressure)之公司為403筆資料，本研究使用橫斷面資料(Cross-Sectional data)，應計盈餘管理模型採用Modified-Jones Model(Jones，1991)暨資產負債表法(Balance Sheet Method)，真實盈餘管理模型採用Roychowdhury(2006)提出之異常水準現金流量(AB_CFO)，異常水準生產成本(AB_PROD)，異常水準裁決性費用(AB_DISX)及標準化真實盈餘管理指數(RM_INDEX)。實證發現，當公司面臨盈餘壓力，執行長誘因薪酬與裁決性應計數(Discretionary Accruals)顯著為負，表示因訴訟風險及沙賓法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Bill)的實施，導致企業做盈餘管理向下(Earnings Management Downward)，而真實盈餘管理與誘因薪酬顯著為正，屬於盈餘管理向上(Earnings Management Upward)，兩者間有替代關係(Substitutes)。本研究以董事會特性(Board Characteristics)及審計委員會特性(Audit Committee Characteristics)為公司治理代理變數，公司治理較佳之代理變數為董事會規模大於平均數，獨立董事佔董事會比率大於平均數，獨立董事規模大於平均數或是審計委員會規模大於平均數，實證結果顯示，公司治理好之企業並無盈餘管理現象，包含應計與真實，顯然公司治理確實有效抑制盈餘管理現象。公司治理較差之企業，執行長誘因薪酬與應計盈餘管理顯著為負，與真實盈餘管理顯著為正，顯示公司治理較差之企業，確實有盈餘管理之存在，而此兩種盈餘管理方法呈現替換關係，顯示在沙賓法案實施後，確實影響經理人盈餘管理現象，從應計盈餘管理(Accrual-based Earnings Management)改為真實盈餘管理(Real-based Earnings Management)，可降低訴訟風險(Litigation Risk)也較不易被審計人員偵測。

摘要(英)

In this paper, we examine the association between CEO incen¬tive pay and earnings management when the company face financial or earnings pressure, and consider the corporate governance situation it’s good or bad. We use the firm from American during 2003 to 2007. There are 1061 observation , include 403 sample have financial pres¬sure. Our results find that negative association between CEO incen¬tive pay and discretionary accruals and a positive relaction between CEO incentive pay and real earnings management when company face the financial pressure. This results suggest Cohen(2008) , due to Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, increase the litigation risk that make CEO used less discretionary accruals and more real earnings management after SOX.
Moreover, we defines the corporate governance characteristics could divide to board and audit committee. The board size and board independence or audit committee size are above the mean could pre-sent the corporate governance proxy variables.The study finds corpo¬rate governance could limiting the earnings management(accruals and real).
We also finds that lower corporate goverance characteristics have a significant negative association between CEO incentive pay and discretionary accruals and a significant positive association be-tween CEO incentive pay and real earnings management. These re-sults consistent prior document,suggesting that firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings management methods after the passage of SOX. Our evidence suggests that firms are likely to have switched to earnings management techniques that are harder to detect and have lower litigation risk.

關鍵字(中)

★ 沙賓法案
★ 財務壓力
★ 公司治理
★ 應計盈餘管理
★ 真實盈餘管理
★ 執行長誘因薪酬

關鍵字(英)

★ CEO incentive pay
★ Sarbanes-Oxley Bill
★ Real earnings management
★ Financial pressure
★ Coporate governance
★ Accruals earnings management

論文目次

中文摘要 ............................................. I
ABSTRACT ........................................... III
誌謝 ................................................. V
目錄 ................................................ VI
圖目錄 ............................................. VII
表目錄 ............................................ VIII
一、緒論 .......................................... 1
1-1 研究背景與動機 ............................. 1
1-2 研究目的與預期貢獻 ......................... 6
1-3 研究架構與研究流程圖 ....................... 7
二、文獻探討 ...................................... 9
2-1 應計盈餘管理文獻 ........................... 9
2-2 真實盈餘管理文獻 .......................... 16
2-3 權益性酬勞文獻 ............................ 19
2-4 公司治理文獻 .............................. 25
2-4-1 董事會治理特性 ........................ 26
2-4-2 審計委員會治理特性 .................... 28
三、研究假說與研究設計 ........................... 32
3-1 研究假說 .................................. 32
3-2 研究設計 .................................. 36
3-2-1 應計盈餘管理模型 ...................... 36
3-2-2 真實盈餘管理模型 ...................... 38
3-2-3 本研究實證模型 ........................ 43
3-2-4 變數定義表 ............................ 46
3-2-5 樣本選取與樣本統計 .................... 47
四、實證結果與分析 ............................... 50
4-1 敘述統計與相關性矩陣 ...................... 50
4-2 實證結果與分析 ............................ 55
4-3 穩健性測試 ................................ 68
五、結論 ........................................ 74
5-1 研究結論 .................................. 74
5-2 研究限制與建議 ............................ 76
參考文獻 ............................................ 77
圖目錄
圖1 ................................................ 14
圖2 ................................................ 15
圖3 ................................................ 17

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指導教授

盧佳琪(Chia-chi Lu)

審核日期

2012-6-25

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