控制型態、監察人內部化及財務報表重編對董監事暨重要職員保險決策之影響

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姓名

陳威志(WEI-CHIH CHEN) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

會計研究所

論文名稱

控制型態、監察人內部化及財務報表重編對董監事暨重要職員保險決策之影響
(D&O insurance needs and enterprises purchasing D&O insurance on insurance amounts from views of business control types, supervisors internalization and restated financial statements)

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摘要(中)

由於近年來，諸多舞弊案件相繼爆發，因而導致政府、企業及投資人等對於公司治理愈趨重視，其中董監事及重要職員保險(Directors and Officers Liability Insurance)是我國近年逐漸重視的一項公司治理議題。過去對D&O保險之研究大多指出D&O保險需求動機與公司治理有著密切相關。因此本研究將以公司治理之觀點探討D&O保險之需求之影響及另針對已購買D&O保險之企業的投保金額可能影響之原因詳加探討。
本研究係從台灣經濟新報(TEJ)獲取2009年至2011年D&O保險之相關資料。其中將探討企業控制型態、監察人內部化及財務報表重編對D&O保險需求之影響原因及是否影響已購買D&O保險之企業的投保金額。本研究實證首先採用OLS多元迴歸模型，另在敏感性測試時，採用Logistic 迴歸模型及Tobit 迴歸模型實證以達穩健性。
本研究實證結果顯示，非家族企業之公司相較於家族企業之公司較有可能購買D&O保險且購買較高之D&O保險金額、無監察人內部化之企業相較於監察人內部化之企業較有可能購買D&O保險且投保較高之D&O保險金額及財務報表重編次數愈高之企業愈有可能購買D&O保險且投保較高之D&O保險金額。本研究實證結果展望能提供政府、企業、投資人及保險公司等愈加關注D&O保險議題，且提供投資人及保險公司等關於企業購買D&O保險之原因及購買D&O保險金額高低的動機。

摘要(英)

In recent years, because of continuous outbreaks of bribery and fraud events, the government, enterprises and investors gradually place more and more emphasis on corporate governance. In Taiwan, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance is one of the corporate governance issues that have caught much attention for the past few years. In the past, researches about D&O insurance mostly point out that there exists high relevance between the motive for insurance needs and corporate governance. Hence, from the point of view of corporate governance, our study investigates the reasons to influence both D&O insurance needs and enterprises purchasing D&O insurance on insurance amounts.
Our study explores the reasons to influence D&O insurance needs and enterprises purchasing D&O insurance on insurance amounts from views of business control types, supervisors internalization and restated financial statements. We categorize business control types into family enterprises and non-family enterprises, supervisors internalization into enterprises with and without supervisors internalization. Moreover, we also examine the number of times to restate financial statements on the impacts of D&O insurance needs and insurance amounts for enterprises purchasing D&O insurance. For empirical results, we take OLS regression model and use Logistic and Tobit regression model in the sensitivity test to reach stable status.
Empirical results reveal that non-family enterprises compared with family enterprises are more likely to purchase D&O insurance and also with higher insurance amounts. Besides, enterprises without supervisors internalization and with higher times to restate financial statements are more probable to purchase insurance with higher amounts. Our results hope to arouse the attention on insurance issues for the government, enterprises, investors and insurance companies. We provide the motives of enterprises purchasing D&O insurance and insurance amounts on D&O insurance for investors and insurance companies.

關鍵字(中)

★ D&
★ O保險
★ 公司治理
★ 控制型態
★ 監察人內部化
★ 財務報表重編

關鍵字(英)

★ D&
★ O Insurance
★ Corporate Governance
★ Business Control Types,
★ Supervisors Internalization,
★ Restated Financial Statements

論文目次

中文摘要 ........iii
ABSTRACT .......iv
誌謝 ............v
目錄 ............vi
圖目錄 ...........ix
表目錄 ............x
第一章緒論 .....................1
1-1 研究背景與動機 ................1
1-1-1 研究背景 ....................1
1-1-2 我國D&O保險投保情形 ............2
1-1-3 研究動機 ......................5
1-2 研究目的 .........................8
1-3 研究流程 .........................10
第二章文獻回顧與探討 .............11
2-1 家族企業 .....................11
2-1-1 家族企業定義 .................11
2-1-2 家族企業的競爭優勢 .............14
2-1-3 家族企業之重要理論 ..............15
2-1-4 公司治理 .......................18
2-1-5 家族企業之相關文獻 ................20
2-2 監察人內部化 ........................21
2-2-1 監察人的意義 .......................21
2-2-2 監察人內部化之相關文獻 ................21
2-3 財務報表重編 ...........................23
2-3-1 財務報表重編之標準 .....................23
2-3-2 財務報表重編之相關文獻 ...................24
2-3-3 董監事及重要職員責任保險 ..................26
第三章研究設計 ..............34
3-1 研究架構 .................34
3-2 研究樣本 ...................35
3-2-1 研究期間 ..................35
3-2-2 研究對象 ...................35
3-2-3 資料來源 ....................35
3-3 研究假說之建立 ...................36
3-3-1 是否為家族企業與是否購買D&O保險之關係..36
3-3-2 是否為家族企業與購買D&O保險金額之關係...37
3-3-3 是否有監察人內部化與是否購買D&O保險的關係..37
3-3-4 前一年度財務報表重編與是否購買D&O保險之關係..38
3-3-5 前一年度財務報表重編與投保D&O保險金額之關係 ..38
3-4 實證模型 ................................. 40
3-5 模型定義與衡量 ...............................42
3-5-1 應變數之衡量 ............. ..................42
3-5-2 主要變數之衡量 ...............................42
3-5-3 控制變數之衡量 ................................43
3-5-4 變數定義彙總表 .................................44
第四章實證結果分析 ..................46
4-1 敘述性統計與相關係數分析 ...........46
4-1-1 敘述性統計分析 ..................46
4-1-2 相關係數分析 .....................49
4-2 實證結果分析 ........................53
4-3 敏感性分析 ...........................58
第五章結論與建議 .....................61
5-1 研究結論 ..........................61
5-2 研究貢獻 ............................62
5-3 研究限制與建議 .........................63
參考文獻 .............................65

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指導教授

王曉雯(HSIAO-WEN WANG)

審核日期

2013-8-29

推文