| dc.description.abstract | This study analyzes pricing decisions concerning warranty, bundling, and investment strategies in two competitive markets, a duopoly and a two-echelon supply chain under a power structure. Firstly, we examine the joint impact of the warranty and bundling strategies on pricing decisions considering the spatial competition in a duopolistic market. By constructing a Nash equilibrium model, we propose two scenarios to determine the optimal manufacturer’s strategic decisions: pure and mixed bundling scenarios. In the pure bundling scenario, two manufacturers offer a bundled base warranty. Meanwhile, in the mixed bundling scenario, both manufacturers provide a bundled base warranty, but one upgrades its service by additionally offering an unbundled extended warranty. Secondly, we analyze the interplay of quality and warranty investments, assuming two heterogeneous customer demands exist in a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer under power structures. A manufacturer invests in a specific quality level to produce a quality product. Meanwhile, a retailer invests in the extended warranty service provision as an after-sales service. Three analytical decision-making models are developed using the game theory: centralized, manufacturer-led decentralized, and retailer-led decentralized models. Further-more, we propose wholesale price contracts considering power structures to coordinate effectively and achieve a win-win situation. Finally, numerical and sensitivity analyzes confirm the analytical results and yield managerial insights. | en_US |