博碩士論文 92421053 完整後設資料紀錄

DC 欄位 語言
DC.contributor企業管理學系zh_TW
DC.creator陳育靖zh_TW
DC.creatorYu-ching Chenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-5-28T07:39:07Z
dc.date.available2007-5-28T07:39:07Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.urihttp://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw:444/thesis/view_etd.asp?URN=92421053
dc.contributor.department企業管理學系zh_TW
DC.description國立中央大學zh_TW
DC.descriptionNational Central Universityen_US
dc.description.abstract本研究旨在探討公司所有權結構,是否會影響管理當局自願性財務預測的品質,以及自願性財務預測對分析師預測的影響。本文承襲La Porta et al.(1999),以投票權與盈餘分配權的偏離程度,作為代理問題的衡量指標。實證結果發現,公司最終控制股東投票權與盈餘分配權偏離程度較小的公司,自願性盈餘預測較準確。此外,自願性盈餘預測具有資訊價值,可普遍降低分析師預測的誤差與離散程度。最後本文亦發現投票權與盈餘分配權偏離程度較大的公司,分析師預測的誤差與離散程度降低較小。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the association among the corporate ownership structure and the quality of managerial voluntary earnings forecasts, and the association of managerial voluntary earnings forecasts and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Following La Porta et al. (1999), we measure the magnitude of agency problem with the deviation of controlling shareholder’s voting rights from cash flow rights. The empirical results show that when the degree of this deviation is smaller, the managerial voluntary earnings forecasts are more accurate. Furthermore, for firms with smaller deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights, the analyst’s average forecast error diminishes more after managers voluntarily declare earnings forecasts.en_US
DC.subject分析師預測zh_TW
DC.subject自願性盈餘預測zh_TW
DC.subject公司所有權結構zh_TW
DC.subjectAnalysts’ forecasts accuracyen_US
DC.subjectVoluntary earnings forecastsen_US
DC.subjectCorporate Ownership structureen_US
DC.title自願揭露盈餘預測對分析師預測的影響:以最終控制股東股權治理結構分析zh_TW
dc.language.isozh-TWzh-TW
DC.titleThe relationship Analyst forecast accuracy and voluntary earnings forecasts :ultimate controlling shareholder’s ownership structure testen_US
DC.type博碩士論文zh_TW
DC.typethesisen_US
DC.publisherNational Central Universityen_US

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