| dc.description.abstract | This thesis investigates the foundation and development of the controversy of animal rights, with Regan’s theory of animal rights as our focus. Regan forms ideal moral principles through moral intuitions. He argues that non-human animals are what he calls the subject-of-a-life, just as humans are, and that, if we want to ascribe inherent value to all human beings including moral patients who are capable of rationality, then in order to be consistent we must similarly ascribe it to non-human animals. Regan’’s argument for animal rights does not rely on a radical new theory of ethics, but follows from a consistent application of moral principles and insights that many of us already hold with respect to the ethical treatment of human beings. Regan holds that non-human animals are the bearers of moral rights. His philosophy lies broadly within the tradition of Immanuel Kant, though he rejects Kant’’s idea that respect is due only to rational beings. He also adopts the approach of John S. Mill that moral rights are justified by moral principles, and such approach forms Regan’s view of animal rights.
The basic right that all who possess inherent value has, he argues, is the right never to be treated merely as a means to the ends of others. It entails the right to be treated with respect; this includes the right not to be harmed. This right, however, is not absolute. His philosophy employs principles such as the miniride principle and the worse-off principle. According to Regan, animals are endowed with basic right to be treated with respect that we should abolish the breeding of animals for food, animal experimentation, and commercial hunting.
In order to show the special features of Regan’s theory, I analyzes how Reagan responds to the challenge posted by Warren’s multi-criterial concept. The difficulties and value of Regan’s view of animal rights are thoroughly reviewed; the topic of animal rights was also analyzed and discussed in depth. | en_US |