博碩士論文 964301006 完整後設資料紀錄

DC 欄位 語言
DC.contributor企業管理學系在職專班zh_TW
DC.creator徐聖堯zh_TW
DC.creatorSheng-yao Hsuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-1-19T07:39:07Z
dc.date.available2010-1-19T07:39:07Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.urihttp://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw:444/thesis/view_etd.asp?URN=964301006
dc.contributor.department企業管理學系在職專班zh_TW
DC.description國立中央大學zh_TW
DC.descriptionNational Central Universityen_US
dc.description.abstract本文欲檢視我國金管會於民國95年修正年報董監事得分人分項揭露薪酬的規定,改為依薪資級距公告後,調查國內上市公司後發現總經理替換率-績效敏感度較修正公告前小。其中非家族企業下降比較家族企業雇用外部總經理者多、家族企業中家族成員擔任總經理之企業下降比也較家族雇用外部總經理者多。本研究提供證據顯示法律對於薪酬揭露的管制越嚴格,總經理的表現越能與公司績效相連結。 zh_TW
dc.description.abstractIn 2006, the Financial Supervisory Commission amended articles of “Regulations Governing Information to be Published in Annual Reports of Public Companies”. It reduced the quality of mandated compensation disclosure. This study investigates the impact of mandated compensation disclosure on firms’’ CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We find that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity become less than before, with the poor quality of mandated disclosure. Moreover, we also examine how the decrease of CEO turnover-performance sen-sitivity varies across three types of firms – family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms, and non-family firms. The empirical findings are consistent with the decrease of CEO turno-ver-performance sensitivity is lower for family CEO firms and non-family firms than for pro-fessional CEO family firms, with the poor quality of mandated disclosure. en_US
DC.subject總經理替換zh_TW
DC.subject家族企業zh_TW
DC.subject強制揭露獎酬zh_TW
DC.subjectMandated compensation disclosureen_US
DC.subjectFamily firmsen_US
DC.subjectCEO turnoveren_US
DC.title總經理替換率-績效敏感度關連性之研究zh_TW
dc.language.isozh-TWzh-TW
DC.titleThe Association between CEO Turnover and Firm Performanceen_US
DC.type博碩士論文zh_TW
DC.typethesisen_US
DC.publisherNational Central Universityen_US

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