| DC 欄位 |
值 |
語言 |
| DC.contributor | 工業管理研究所 | zh_TW |
| DC.creator | 李穎杰 | zh_TW |
| DC.creator | Ying-chieh Li | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-6-27T07:39:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-6-27T07:39:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw:444/thesis/view_etd.asp?URN=994206023 | |
| dc.contributor.department | 工業管理研究所 | zh_TW |
| DC.description | 國立中央大學 | zh_TW |
| DC.description | National Central University | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | 近年來由於科技快速進步，相關消費性產品普及率逐年提高，相對地淘汰之舊品亦逐年增加，惟大多數消費性產品無法在自然環境中自行分解，若未妥善處理，不僅形成資源浪費，勢將嚴重污染環境。為了達到永續經營以及完善企業社會責任的目的，使用再製造產品是目前的製造業的趨勢，故我國資源回收與再生產業的存在是落實責任業者延長生產者責任的關鍵。
本研究先透過深度的資料收集分析，初步了解資源回收政策對資源回收與再生產業，還有政策影響之利害關係人的衝擊，同時延伸Hong and Ke (2011) 的研究，探討在一個逆物流供應鏈中，除了政府的環境汙染費與補貼外，關係廠商之間的商業行為對逆物流體系所造成的影響。
我們建立一個stackelberg-type 模型，這個三階段模型第一階段的Leader是環保署資源回收管理基金管理委員會(簡稱基管會)，Follow是責任業者；第二階段的Leader是責任業者，Follow為新零組件供應商與回收處理業者；最後一階段為新零組件供應商與回收處理業者分別根據自身利潤最大化的方式決定生產產品的數量與價格。
為了最大化社會利潤， 基管會依照費審議委員會(簡稱委員會)的建議決定汙染費及回收補貼。依照目前的結果我們發現回饋金 P_w與再生零組件市場價格有關以及汙染費t對最終產品的數量影響相反。在未來的研究中，我們將會將模型修正的更符合現實以及就數值分析的結果探討其管理意涵。
| zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Owing to the development of technological progress, the penetration rate of consumer electronics products is improving year by year. The most of consumer electronics products can not be degradable. If we can’t cope with the end-of-life products, not only waste resources but cause environmental pollution seriously. In order to achieve the purpose of sustainable operation , remanufacturing system is the trend. For this reason, resources industry is the key point of implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR).
This research mainly takes Hong & Ke’s “Determining Advanced Recycling Fees (ARF) and subsidies in “E-scrap” Reverse Supply Chains.”Beside, the target of this study is to observe the business behavior between firms except ARF and subsidies for reverse logistics.
We constructed a three-stage game model to find out an optimal economic policy. The leader in the first stage is Recycling Fund Management Board. The fund below to Environmental Protection Administration (EPA), the follower is manufacturer. The leader in the second stage is manufacturer and the followers are supplier and recycler. Finally, the leaders in the third stage are supplier and recycler. They make the optimal selling quantity and pricing in the market .In the same time , they make the optimal reward for customers and recycling quantity too.
For develop an optimal economic policy, EPA makes the ARF and subsidies. According to the results of the recent study, we find that recycling reward related to remanufacturing parts price. The quantity of goods are contrary to ARF. In the future, we will refine the model and explore managerial implications
| en_US |
| DC.subject | Stackelberg模型 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | 資源再生產業 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | 補貼 | zh_TW |
| DC.subject | subsidies | en_US |
| DC.subject | green supply chain | en_US |
| DC.subject | recycling fees | en_US |
| DC.subject | game theory | en_US |
| DC.title | 考慮汙染費、補貼及廠商間商業行為之廢棄物逆向供應鏈模型 | zh_TW |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | zh-TW |
| DC.title | The model analysis between pollution charges, subsidy and business interaction behavior for end of life products in the reverse supply chain | en_US |
| DC.type | 博碩士論文 | zh_TW |
| DC.type | thesis | en_US |
| DC.publisher | National Central University | en_US |