| dc.description.abstract | Coordination mechanism for supply chain has been studied in many researches in the past. Their objective are want to supply chain’s profit maximize that increase the supplier’s and retailer’s profits. Many coordination mechanisms were proposed to achieve channel coordination. For example, buy back contract that supplier provide buy back price for retailer unsold product.it can decrease retailer’s risk. Most of coordination mechanisms are discussed based on considering risk-neutral decision makers. In other words, the supplier’s and the retailer’s attitudes toward risks are assumed risk-neutral when they making decisions. The study point when the supplier’s and the retailer’s attitudes toward risks are assumed risk-neutral that any contract are indifferent. In the fact, the retailer’s decision be affected many factors. These factors have risk, loyal, loss, and so on.
Therefore, we consider their risk preferences into the design of contracts in this study. In a push contract, the retailer to endure all of the inventory risk, and the retailer’s attitude toward risk affects her decision. As a result, it is important for the supplier to consider the opponent’s risk preference. In this study, the supplier provides coordination contract to the risk-averse retailer in order to increase both profits. We analyze three cases. In case 1, the supplier faces the retailer is risk-neutral. In case 2, the supplier does not know the retailer is risk-averse, and in case 3, the supplier knows the retailer is risk-averse. We discuss these three cases in the coordination mechanism contract. Finally, we try to show risk-aversion affect coordination contracts, in other words, which coordination mechanism is more robust. | en_US |