退貨政策與異質零售商之最佳產銷決策

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姓名

張軒誌(Hsuan-Chih Chang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

工業管理研究所

論文名稱

退貨政策與異質零售商之最佳產銷決策
(Optimal decisions for the heterogeneous retailers in return policy)

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摘要(中)

在現今供應鏈體系中，產銷過程是值得關注及環環相扣，零售商的競爭行為日趨明顯，而當中製造商採行退貨政策或是其他機制，透過共同分攤銷售風險之方式，鼓勵零售商提高產品訂購數量，亦增加產品銷售，以減少退貨機會，促使雙方互惠，達成產銷協調之目標。

本研究在二階層通路結構中，以Padmanabhan and Png（1997）的退貨方式作為背景，並劃分大小型的零售商相互競爭的結構，探討當兩者不同類型的零售商雙通路競爭下，整體市場需求與價格都有相互牽制影響，其中以Stackelberg 賽局理論之單期模型，兩者間領導者（製造商）與追隨者（零售商）之層級關係時，分析最佳的決策變數後，得到兩種均衡的最佳批發價、訂購量與零售價格，製造商最後決策實施無退貨或全額退貨政策，以本身利潤改善為決策考量。本研究是以製造商的最大利潤為目的，採取上述不同決策所產生的結果，結果說明當製造商實施全額退貨政策會顯著改善製造商利潤，並有助於整體通路利潤。

摘要(英)

Return policy has become closely linked with production and marketing process in particular that it has a major effect in supply chains that are highly competitive. In addition, not only that return policy is an approach to share the risk of inventory for manufacturers and retailers, return policy also makes them achieve production-marketing coordination.

The paper models a two-echelon supply chain which consists of one manufacturer and two competitive retailers, where one of the retailers is dominant. The work of Padmanbhan and Png (1997) highlights the return policy that is applied in manufacturer-retailer channels.

In this study, two policies are offered by the manufacturer, the no return and the full return policies in order to explore the wholesale price, the order quantity and the retail price under the heterogeneous retailers’ competitive channel.

This study adopts the game-theoretic model to determine the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader and two retailers as Followers.

This study is to investigate whether return policy will change the manufacturer’s strategy. Computation results illustrate that the manufacturer can obtain more profits by adopting a full return policy. Therefore, by providing a full return policy, the manufacturer can make an obvious improvement on its marketing efficiency.

關鍵字(中)

★ Stackelberg 賽局理論
★ 退貨策略
★ 價格競爭

關鍵字(英)

★ Stackelberg model
★ Return Policy
★ Price competition

論文目次

論文提要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iii
圖目錄 v
表目錄 vi
第一章緒論 1
1.1 研究動機 1
1.2 研究背景 2
1.3 研究目的 3
1.4 研究架構 4
第二章文獻回顧 6
2.1 Stackelberg 賽局理論 6
2.2 退貨策略 7
2.3 價格競爭 9
第三章模型建構 12
3.1 情境描述 12
3.2 模型基本假設 13
3.3 符號定義 14
3.4 模型建構 15
3.4.1 基本模型建構 15
3.4.2 不同批發價建構模型 16
第四章模型分析 23
4.1 參數設定 23
4.2 數值分析 24
4.3 決策變數與參數之關係 25
4.3.1 決策變數之批發價格 25
4.3.2 決策變數之訂購量 26
4.3.3 決策變數之零售價格 27
4.4 敏感度分析 27
4.4.1 市場規模 27
4.4.2 製造成本 29
4.4.3 顧客價格敏感度之存貨水準 30
4.4.4 競爭因子 32
第五章結論與未來研究方向 34
5.1 結論 34
5.2 研究貢獻 35
5.3 未來研究方向 35
參考文獻 36
附錄 38

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指導教授

陳振明

審核日期

2017-6-15

推文