摘要(英) |
This paper establishes a vertical-related model in which intermediate goods market is free entry to discuss the research and development (R&D) of downstream firms and the impacts of downstream firms’ R&D on the price of
intermediate goods under floating price contract and fixed price contract.
The major findings of this paper are that: first, under the floating price contract, the price of intermediate goods won’t be affected by the R&D decisions of the downstream firms when the intermediate goods market is free
entry, regardless of R&D spillovers; second, the amount of R&D under the case that the intermediate goods market is free entry will be more than that the
intermediate goods market is monopoly; last, if there exists R&D spillovers, the R&D level of downstream firms will decreases but the quantities will increase at
first then decrease with the spillover effects. The above results are quite different from the previous literatures’ conclusions. |
參考文獻 |
蔡明芳 (2014) ,「垂直寡占市場結構下的最終財廠商研發誘因」,經濟論
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