高階經理人薪酬對公司績效之影響

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趙蓮儀(LIEN-I CHAO) 查詢紙本館藏

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論文名稱

高階經理人薪酬對公司績效之影響
(The Effects of Top Management Compensation on Firm Performance)

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摘要(中)

本研究將薪酬結構主要分成薪酬水準與薪酬差距兩大特徵，以代理理論及競賽理論的觀點為基礎探討高階經理人薪酬結構對公司績效之影響。本研究與過去國內其他研究最大的相異處為加入公司特性如系統性風險值、考慮CEO雙重性及電子產業研發支出比率等變數，探討若提高薪酬差距與高階經理人平均薪酬對公司績效之影響。
本研究主要是分析台灣上市公司高階經理人薪酬對公司績效之影響效果，資料來源主要取自台灣經濟新報資料庫及公開資訊觀測站，以台灣上市公司2010年至2017年財報資料為研究對象，包含了橫斷面與時間序列的資料整理。研究結果顯示公司高階經理人前期的薪酬水準、激勵薪占本薪比率、高階經理人與其他員工前期的薪酬差距，對於公司績效皆具有顯著的正相關，此結果不但證實了代理理論的觀點，應將高階經理人薪酬與其績效緊密結合，更說明了員工分紅在高階經理人薪酬中所扮演的重要角色。此外，也證實了競賽理論的觀點，當高階經理人領取較多的薪酬，將能誘使公司其他員工為了獲取更高的報酬，晉升至更高的階級，而投入最大的努力。
然而，實證顯示前期高階經理人總薪酬占稅後純益比率愈高，對員工生產力、資產報酬率(ROA)有顯著負相關，會顯著降低公司經營績效，且對公司未來價值成長性也產生負向影響但不顯著。隨著2008年員工分紅費用化後，發放股票分紅的公司家數明顯減少，導致高階經理人股票分紅比率大幅下滑，故實證顯示高階經理人分紅占總員工分紅比率對公司績效產生不顯著影響效果。
此外，本研究發現公司系統性風險愈高，若擴大高階經理人與其他員工之薪酬差距，對公司績效之資產報酬率(ROA)、Tobin’s Q產生正向影響效果，其中對公司市場價值指標Tobin’s Q影響最顯著，但對員工生產力產生負向不顯著之影響效果。其中針對電子產業之上市公司實證分析結果，此變數對資產報酬率(ROA)產生正向顯著影響效果。本研究顯示研發支出比率愈高之公司，若提高高階經理人平均薪酬，對公司績效之資產報酬率(ROA)、Tobin’s Q產生正向影響效果，其中對資產報酬率(ROA)具顯著正向影響，可強化公司資產使用效率，以提升公司績效，但對員工生產力產生不顯著負向影響效果。
本研究也加入董事長兼任總經理變數，探討提高高階經理人平均薪酬對公司績效之影響，實證顯示對公司績效影響不顯著，其中對員工生產力、資產報酬率(ROA)有正向影響效果，但對Tobin’s Q產生負向影響效果。其中針對電子產業之上市公司實證分析結果，此變數對員工生產力產生正向顯著影響效果。
另外，本研究也探討屬電子產業公司之研發支出比率對公司績效之影響，實證顯示對公司績效影響不顯著。但屬電子產業之公司研發支出比率愈高，若提高高階經理人平均薪酬將對資產報酬率與Tobin’s Q有正向影響效果，其中對Tobin’s Q有顯著正向影響，可提升公司未來價值成長，但對員工生產力產生不顯著負向影響。
本研究期望企業在考量公司之治理及未來競爭力時，能給予公司在思考調整薪酬結構時，可透過薪酬制度設計解決部分代理問題並激勵員工努力，進而提升公司績效，以提供一參考的方向。

摘要(英)

The purpose of the study is to discuss the effects of top management compensation on firm performance based on the agency theory and the tournament theory. The biggest difference from other researches in the past is to consider variables such as risk, CEO duality and the R&D expense ratio of the electronics industry, and analyze the impact of increasing the pay gaps and the average compensation of top managers on firm performance. The variable data of top management compensation and firm performance are collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and Market Observation Post System during 2010 to 2017, which is based on the secondary data of listed companies in Taiwan.

Results indicate that the top management compensation level, motivation compensation ratio, and the wage differential between top managers and other employees have a significantly positive effect on firm performance. However, the empirical evidence shows that the higher ratio of top manager’s compensation to profit after tax results the significantly negative effect on firm performance(return on assets (ROA) and employee productivity), which will significantly reduce the firm′s operating performance and impact the firm′s future growth value. The implementation of expensing employee bonus policy in 2008 ,can really reduce the level of top manager’s bonus because of decreasing stock bonus significantly in many firms .The evidence shows that it cause the ratio of top manager’s bonus to the total sharing profits with employees has no significant effect on firm performance.

Furthermore, the results indicate that the companies with higher systemic risk (Beta) and the increasing pay gaps between top managers and other employees can have a positive correlation with firm performance on return on assets (ROA) and Tobin′s Q, especially have significant effect on Tobin′s Q. The empirical analysis of this variable for listed companies in the electronics industry has a significantly positive effect on the return on assets (ROA).

The evidence shows that the companies with higher R&D expense ratio which enhance the average compensation level of top managers can have a positive effect on firm performance(return on assets (ROA)and Tobin′s Q),especially have significant effect on ROA. But, the results show that the above two variables have no significant effect on employee productivity.

In addition, the research add the variable of CEO duality to discuss that the effects of increasing top manager’s average compensation on firm performance. The evidence shows that the effect on firm performance is not significant ,which has a positive correlation with employee productivity and return on assets (ROA) ,but minor negative impact on Tobin′s Q. The empirical analysis of this variable for listed companies in the electronics industry has a significantly positive effect on the employee productivity.
The research also discuss that the impact of R&D expenditure ratios of electronic industry on firm performance. Empirical evidence shows that the impact on firm performance is not significant. However, if the companies enhance the top manager’s average compensation, it will have a positive effect on firm performance(return on assets (ROA)and Tobin′s Q ), especially have significant effect on Tobin’s Q , which can enhance the company′s growth value. But, the result shows that the variable has no significant effect on employee productivity.

According to the agency theory and the tournament theory, they provided criterions for how to decide wage structures which can increase firm performance. An appropriate wage structure not only can retain the top management team but also can motivate firm’s key talents to promote their performance hard in the sequential tournaments. This study expects that it can provide a reference for improving the firm performance through adjusting the management compensation structure when companies consider the corporate governance and future competitiveness.

關鍵字(中)

★ 高階經理人薪酬結構
★ 公司績效
★ 股票分紅
★ 薪酬差距

關鍵字(英)

★ top management team
★ top management compensation
★ firm performance
★ wage structure
★ wage differential

論文目次

目錄
中文摘要 …………………………………………………………………… I
英文摘要 …………………………………………………………………… III
目錄 ………………………………………………………………………… VI
圖目錄 ……………………………………………………………………… VIII
表目錄 ……………………………………………………………………… VIII
第壹章緒論………………………………………………………………… 1
第一節研究背景與動機……………………………………………… 1
第二節研究目的……………………………………………………… 4
第三節研究架構……………………………………………………… 4
第貳章文獻探討…………………………………………………………… 6
第一節代理理論與競賽理論………………………………………… 6
第二節高階經理人之薪酬型態……………………………………… 10
第三節高階經理人薪酬與公司績效之關聯性……………………… 12
第四節董事長兼任總經理與公司績效之關聯性…………………… 18
第五節研發支出與公司績效之關聯性……………………………… 19
第參章研究假說與方法…………………………………………………… 21
第一節研究假說……………………………………………………… 21
第二節研究架構……………………………………………………… 26
第三節樣本資料……………………………………………………… 27
第四節研究方法與變數定義………………………………………… 30
第肆章實證結果…………………………………………………………… 41
第一節敘述性統計分析……………………………………………… 41
第二節實證結果分析………………………………………………… 43
第伍章結論與建議………………………………………………………… 86
第一節研究發現與討論……………………………………………… 86
第二節管理意涵……………………………………………………… 94
第三節研究限制與未來研究方向…………………………………… 95
參考文獻 …………………………………………………………………… 98

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指導教授

徐政義(Cheng‑Yi Shiu)

審核日期

2019-6-5

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