超額投保董監事責任險對審計公費之影響-以訴訟風險作為中介效果

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游仕鈞(Shih-Chun Yu) 查詢紙本館藏

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會計研究所

論文名稱

超額投保董監事責任險對審計公費之影響-以訴訟風險作為中介效果
(The Relationship between Excess D&O Insurance Coverage and Audit Fees : The Mediator Effect of Litigation Risk)

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摘要(中)

金管會為強化我國公司治理、發揮董監事監督職能，認為公司投保董監事及重要職員責任保險（D&O責任險）可以有效降低董監事任職的壓力，希望藉此吸引優秀董事，因此宣布上市櫃公司自2019年6月起均應強制投保D&O責任險。學術上，有關投保D&O責任險的相關文獻普遍有不同觀點，投保D&O責任險可能因管理階層機會主義行為降低或鬆懈其職業應盡之注意，導致道德風險之產生，這樣的行為反而對於公司治理是種損害，且會造成訴訟機率提升，因此以會計師審計服務訂價的角度，也證實會提高審計公費。
本文以2019年至2021年臺灣上市櫃非金融保險業公司為研究樣本，提出超額投保金額與審計公費具正相關係及本文主要貢獻為以訴訟風險對超額投保金額與審計公費之正相關是否具有中介效果，進一步探討超額投保對管理階層行為之影響。
本研究引用Baron and Kenny (1986) 所提出的三步驟檢驗中介效果，但訴訟風險並未與審計公費呈正相關，因此僅能作出D&O責任險超額投保會造成審計公費更高的結論。

摘要(英)

In order to enhance Taiwan corporate governance and give full play to the supervisory functions of directors and supervisors, the Financial Supervisory Commission believes that companies′ Directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance can effectively reduce the pressure of directors and supervisors, hoping to attract outstanding directors, so it announced that it will be mandatory for listed companies carrying out D&O insurance from June 2019.Academically, there are generally different views on the relevant literature on D&O liability insurance. D&O insurance may lead to moral hazard due to the opportunistic behavior of the management that reduces or relaxes the due diligence of their profession. Such behavior has adverse effects on corporate governance. This is a kind of damage and will increase the probability of litigation. Therefore, from the perspective of accountant audit service pricing, it is also confirmed that it will increase audit fees.
This article uses Taiwan′s listed non-financial companies from 2019 to 2021 as a research sample, and proposes that there is a positive relationship between excess D&O insurance coverage and audit fees. The main contribution of this article is whether there is a positive relationship between D&O insurance coverage and audit fees based on litigation risk. The mediator effect further explores the impact of over-insurance on management behavior.
This study uses the three-step test of mediator effects proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). However, litigation risk is not positively related to audit expenses, it can only be concluded that excess D&O liability insurance will lead to higher audit expenses.

關鍵字(中)

★ 董監事責任險
★ 審計公費
★ 訴訟風險

關鍵字(英)

★ D&O Insurance Coverage
★ Audit Fees
★ Litigation Risk

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝辭 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第壹章緒論 1
第貳章文獻探討與假說發展 2
第一節超額D&O責任險與審計公費探討 2
第二節訴訟風險之中介效果 3
第參章研究設計 7
第一節樣本選取及資料來源 7
第二節研究模型與變數衡量 7
第肆章實證結果及分析 13
第一節敘述性統計 13
第二節假說一迴歸結果 16
第三節假說二迴歸結果 18
第伍章結論 20
參考文獻 21

參考文獻

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邱軍瑋、廖珮真（2024）。董監事責任險正常及異常投保金額、機構投資人特性與審計公費之關聯性。臺大管理論叢，34(1)：45-90。
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指導教授

陳建中(Chien-Chung Chen)

審核日期

2024-6-29

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