博碩士論文 111424026 詳細資訊



以作者查詢圖書館館藏 、以作者查詢臺灣博碩士 、以作者查詢全國書目 、勘誤回報 、線上人數：30 、訪客IP：13.59.115.106
姓名 胡以文(Yi-Wen Hu)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 產業經濟研究所
論文名稱 拍賣中「立即購買」選項之價值衡量
(Estimation of value by adding ‘‘Buy It Now’’ in auction)
檔案 [Endnote RIS 格式]    [Bibtex 格式]    [相關文章]   [文章引用]   [完整記錄]   [館藏目錄]   [檢視]  [下載]
  1. 本電子論文使用權限為同意立即開放。
  2. 已達開放權限電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的，進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。
  3. 請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定，切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送，以免觸法。

摘要(中) 本研究探討網路拍賣中商品的不同上架策略，對於賣家預期利潤的影響。上架策略包括三種形式：固定價格、一般次高家拍賣（簡稱「一般拍賣」）及立即購買次高價拍賣（Buy-It-now拍賣，簡稱「BIN拍賣」）。其中，一般拍賣僅需設定保留價格、固定價格上架只要設定直購價格，BIN拍賣則除了保留價格外，還需要設置直購價格。
網路拍賣雖然也是利用競標機制來議定價格，但和傳統拍賣具有許多相異之處。其中最大的不同，是網拍過程所需時間通常遠長於一般拍賣。為了解決這項問題，eBay發明了很多網拍獨有的制度。一為Proxy bid，即投標人只須鍵入願付最高價，而eBay將會自動化為其投標，這讓eBay拍賣實質上等同於次高價拍賣；另一個重要發明，就是「立即購買」選項的使用，這不但讓有時間折現的賣家有機會用自己可接受的價格提早出售，反之讓買家具有提前買進的機會。
因此，本文以理論模型證實，隨著賣家耐心程度增加，「立即購買」選項的價格將逐漸提升；對於完全耐心者而言，一般拍賣與BIN拍賣的效果無異。這進一步表明，折現愈大，賣家愈傾向於利用「立即購買」選項加速交易，以避免因折現造成的收益減少，從而有效提升預期折現利潤。
摘要(英) This study examines the impact of different listing strategies in online auctions on sellers′ expected profits. The listing strategies include three formats: fixed price, second-highest price auction (referred to as ‘‘regular auction’’), and Buy-It-Now auction (referred to as ‘‘BIN auction’’). In a regular auction, only a reserve price needs to be set; for a fixed price listing, only a Buy-It-Now price is required, whereas the BIN auction requires both a reserve price and a Buy It Now price.
Although online auctions also use bidding mechanisms to determine prices, they differ significantly from traditional auctions. The most notable difference is that the duration of online auctions is usually much longer than traditional ones. To address this issue, eBay has developed several unique features for online auctions. One is the Proxy bid system, where bidders only need to enter the maximum price they are willing to pay, and eBay will automatically place bids on their behalf, effectively turning eBay auctions into second-highest price auctions. Another important innovation is the ‘‘Buy-It-Now’’ option, which allows sellers to sell at an acceptable price earlier, benefiting those with time-sensitive needs, while buyers get the opportunity to purchase immediately.
This paper uses a theoretical model to demonstrate that as sellers become more patient, the price of the ‘‘Buy-It-Now’’ option will gradually increase. For fully patient sellers, the effects of regular auctions and BIN auctions are equivalent. This further indicates that the greater the discounting, the more sellers tend to use the ‘‘Buy-It-Now’’ option to expedite transactions, thereby mitigating the loss of income due to discounting and effectively enhancing the expected discounted profit.
關鍵字(中) ★ 拍賣理論
★ 立即購買
★ 時間偏好		 關鍵字(英) ★ Auction theory
★ Buy it now
★ Time preferences
論文目次
摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
誌謝 III
目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
表目錄 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧 6
第一節 拍賣相關名詞定義及分類 6
第二節 線上拍賣發展概況 7
第三節 拍賣市場參與者的經濟行為 8
第三章 基本模型 11
第一節 模型設定 11
第二節 最適化及資料視覺化 12
一、 最適化 12
二、 資料視覺化 15
第四章 結論 26
參考文獻 27
參考文獻 (一) 中文文獻
1. 陳恭平。網路拍賣簡介。中央研究院週報 第1196期。2008年11月。
2. 郭依婷。英式網路拍賣、小型市場及賣方競爭。中國文化大學經濟學研究所碩士論文。2009年12月。
(二) 英文文獻
1. Bajari, P., and A. Hortacsu, “The Winner′s Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions,” RAND Journal of Economics 34 (2003), 329-355.
2. Bauner, C., “Mechanism choice and the buy-it-now auction: A structural model of competing buyers and sellers” International Journal of Industrial Organization 38 (2015), 19-31.
3. Beam, C., and A. Segev, “Auctions on the Internet: A Field Study,” unpublished manuscript, Haas School of Business University of California, Berkeley, 1998.
4. Bichler, M., A. Segev., and C. Beam, “An Electronic Broker for Business-to-Business Electronic Commerce on the Internet,” International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems 7 (1998), 315-329.
5. Budish, E., and L. Takeyama, “Buy Prices in Online Auctions: Irrationality on the Internet? ” Economic Letters 73 (2001), 325-333.
6. Chen, J.-R., K.-P. Chen, C.-F. Chou, and C.-I. Huang, “A Dynamic Model of Auctions with Buy-It-Now: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Industrial Economics 61 (2013), 393-429.
7. Chen, K.-P., S.-H. Ho, C.-H. Liu, and C.-M. Wang, “The Optimal Listing Strategies in Online Auctions,” International Economic Review 58 (2017), 421-437.
8. Dewally, M., and L. H. Ederingtion, “What Attracts Bidders to Online Auctions and What Is Their Incremental Price Impact?” Working paper, Marquette University, 2006.
9. Einav, L., C. Farronato, J. Levin, and N. Sundaresan, “Sales Mechanisms in Online Markets: What Happened to Internet Auction?” Working Paper, Stanford University, 2013.
10. Grebe, T., Ivanova-Stenzel, R., and Kroger, S., “How do sellers benefit from Buy-It-Now prices in eBay auctions?” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 183 (2021), 189-205.
11. Hammond, R. G., “Comparing Revenue from Auctions and Posted Prices,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 28 (2010), 3-42.
12. Hasker, K., and R. Sickles, “eBay in the Economic Literature: Analysis of an Auction Marketplace,” Review of Industrial Organization 37 (2010), 3-42.
13. Hidvegi, Z., W. Wang, and A. B. Whinston, “Buy-Price English Auction,” Journal of Economic Theory 129 (2006), 31-56.
14. Katar, R., and D. H. Reiley, “Public Versus Secret Reserve Prices in eBay Auctions: Results from a Pokemon Field Experiment,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 5 (2007), 1-25.
15. Kumar, M., and S. Feldman, “Internet Auctions,” the 3rd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce Boston, Massachusetts, 1998.
16. Mathews, T., “The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Buy-Out Option: A Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay’s Buy-It-Now Feature,” Journal of Economics 81 (2004), 25-52.
—, and B. Katzman, “The Role of Varying Risk Attitudes in an Auction with a Buyout Option,” Economic Theory 27 (2006), 597-613.
17. McAfee, R. P., and J. McMillan, “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic Literature 25 (1987), 699-738.
18. Myerson, R. B., “Optimal Auction Design,” Mathematics of Operations Research Vol. 6, No. 1 (1981), 58-73.
19. Reynolds, S., and J. Wooders, “Auctions with a Buy Price,” Economic Theory 38 (2009), 9-39.
20. Rothkopf, M. H., and R. Harstad, “Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay,” Management Science 40 (1994), 364-384.
21. Standifird, S. S., Roelofs, M. R., and Durham, Y, “The impact of eBay′s buy-it-now function on bidder behavior,” Journal of Behavioral Finance 6 (2014), 167-176.
22. Surowiecki, James, “Going, Going, Gone: Who Killed The Internet Auction?” Wired Magazine (2011, May 17).
23. Vickrey, W. S., “Counter Speculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of Finance 16 (1961), 8-37.
24. Wang, R., “Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling,” American Economic Review 83 (1993), 838–51.
25. Wang, X., A. L. Montgomery, and K. Srinivasan, “When Auction Meets Fixed Price: A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Buy-It-Now Auctions,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics 6 (2008), 339-70.
26. Wurman, P., M. Wellman., and W. Walsh, “A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space,” Games and Economic 35 (2001), 304-338.
27. Zhang, Z., Haruvy, E., and Popkowski Leszczyc, P. T. L., “On The Reference Point Effect of Reserve and Buy It Now Prices,” Journal of Retailing 98, no. 2 (2022), 356-372.
指導教授 陳恭平 劉錦龍(Kong-Pin Chen Jin-long Liu) 審核日期 2024-12-30
推文 facebook   plurk   twitter   funp   google   live   udn   HD   myshare   reddit   netvibes   friend   youpush   delicious   baidu   
網路書籤 Google bookmarks   del.icio.us   hemidemi   myshare   

若有論文相關問題，請聯絡國立中央大學圖書館推廣服務組 TEL:(03)422-7151轉57407，或E-mail聯絡  - 隱私權政策聲明