A Study of Asymmetric Information in Supply Chain with the Retailer′s Advertising Effectiveness

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姓名

陳易澤(Yi-Ze Chen) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

工業管理研究所

論文名稱

(A Study of Asymmetric Information in Supply Chain with the Retailer′s Advertising Effectiveness)

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摘要(中)

本研究探討了由零售商廣告效果所引起的供應鏈資訊不對稱問題。在全球化的商業環境中，製造商常常需要與國外零售商合作，以打入新的市場。然而，零售商對於在當地市場投入多少廣告成本可以多帶來多少需求相比製造商有更深入的了解，這種資訊不對稱可能導致因廣告帶來的額外利益大部份都落入零售商口袋中。本研究建立了一個的供應鏈模型，以分析這種情況下供應鏈中各角色的策略。
本研究的模型基於經典的報童問題，模型中包含了一個製造商和一個零售商，並引入了廣告效益參數來反應零售商的廣告投資如何影響消費者需求。需求假設為遵循韋伯分佈。
為了解決資訊不對稱問題，我們提出了一種合約機制，稱其為資訊披露合約，以付出資訊費的方式驅使零售商誠實告知真實的廣告效益水準。並在資訊披露合約的基礎上加入協調機制使整體供應鏈達成渠道協調。通過數值分析，我們發現資訊披露合約能在一定程度上增加供應鏈總收益，但仍無法達到最優狀態。相比之下，加入協調機制後的資訊披露合約能夠實現渠道協調，使整體供應鏈總收益最大化。

摘要(英)

This study explores the issue of information asymmetry in the supply chain caused by the advertising effects of retailers. In the globalized business environment, manufacturer often need to collaborate with foreign retailer to enter new markets. Retailer has a deeper understanding than manufacturer regarding how much additional demand can be generated by local advertising investments. This information asymmetry may lead to the extra benefits from advertising mostly accruing to the retailers. This study establishes a supply chain model to analyze the strategies of different roles under such circumstances.
The model in this study is based on the classic newsvendor problem, incorporating a manufacturer and a retailer, and introduces an advertising effectiveness parameter to reflect how the retailer′s advertising investment affects consumer demand. Demand is assumed to follow the Weibull distribution.
To address the issue of information asymmetry, we proposed a contract called the information disclosure contract, which incentivizes the retailer to honestly disclose the true level of advertising effectiveness by offering an information fee. Then we incorporated a coordination mechanism into the information disclosure contract to achieve channel coordination across the entire supply chain. Through numerical analysis, we found that the information disclosure contract can increase the total supply chain profit, but it still not reach optimal state. In contrast, the information disclosure contract with the coordination mechanism can achieve channel coordination, maximizing the total supply chain profit.

關鍵字(中)

★ 供應鏈管理
★ 資訊不對稱
★ 廣告效果

關鍵字(英)

★ Supply chain
★ Asymmetric information
★ Advertising effectiveness

論文目次

Contents
摘要 i
Abstract ii
Contents iii
List of Tables iv
List of Figures iv
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and Motivation 1
1.2 Research Objectives 2
1.3 Research Framework 2
Chapter 2 Literature Review 4
2.1 Newsvendor Problem 4
2.2 Advertising Effectiveness 4
2.3 Asymmetric Information 5
2.4 Coordination Mechanism 7
Chapter 3 Model and analysis 9
3.1 Environment Statement 9
3.2 Base Model 12
3.3 Centralized Model 14
3.4 Information Disclosure Contract 15
3.5 Information Disclosure Contract with Coordination Mechanism 17
Chapter 4 Numerical Example 19
4.1 Base Model 19
4.2 Centralized Model 19
4.3 Information Disclosure Contract 20
4.4 Information Disclosure Contract with Coordination Mechanism 21
Chapter 5 Sensitivity Analysis 23
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis of Manufacturer′s Production Cost 23
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis of Retailer′s Selling Price 25
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Advertising Effectiveness Parameter’s Estimated Value 26
Chapter 6 Conclusion 28
Reference 30

參考文獻

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指導教授

曾富祥(Fu-Shiang Tseng)

審核日期

2024-8-19

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