| 摘要(英) |
This study focuses on Taiwan′s publicly listed financial industry, using sanction announced by the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) from 2012 to 2023 as samples. It employs the Event Study, Logistic regression, OLS regression, and statistical tests to examine the relationship between sanction and stock performance, ownership structures, and shareholder control. Additionally, it compares the effects of sanction events involving controlling shareholders versus non-controlling shareholders on stock performance.
The findings reveal that significant abnormal returns in stock prices are observed one to two days before and after the announcement of sanction, with cumulative negative returns persisting over time. When the event window is extended to 15 days prior to the sanctions, evidence of early reactions in stock prices emerges, suggesting that sanctions are a critical signal for the market and investors. However, for sanctions involving controlling shareholders, neither the post-announcement abnormal returns nor cumulative abnormal returns are statistically significant.
In analyzing ownership structures and sanctions, the study finds that companies with family-controlled structure or pyramid ownership structure face higher sanction risks. In contrast, higher Voting right is associated with reduced sanction likelihood, while increased Board seat-control correlates positively with sanction risks. Companies governed by professional managers receive positive recognition from the market and investors, with relatively better stock performance after sanctions, highlighting the value of professional governance models.
Regarding the relationship between sanction content and stock performance, the study identifies a significant positive correlation between fine of sanction and stock price volatility. This suggests that the negative news of higher penalties is likely to be absorbed earlier by the market, leading to stock price stabilization or recovery post-announcement.
Moreover, indicators of separation of Share Right show no significant impact on stock performance, indicating limited market and investor responses to such information. |
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