在硬體與軟體所組成系統產品產業下的經濟分析

以作者查詢圖書館館藏

、以作者查詢臺灣博碩士

、以作者查詢全國書目

、勘誤回報

、線上人數：50

、訪客IP：3.139.235.177

姓名

張美華(Mei-hua Chang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

產業經濟研究所

論文名稱

在硬體與軟體所組成系統產品產業下的經濟分析
(Three Essays on the Economics of Hardware/Software System Products)

相關論文

★ 中小學教科書市場區位競爭之研究	★ 智慧型手機產業分析
★ 台灣金融控股公司之產業分析	★ 中國銀行產業分析—兼論台資銀行西進策略
★ 探討台灣智慧型手機產業之競爭策略	★ 太陽光電產業分析
★ 台灣航空市場產業分析與營運績效研究	★ LED照明產業市場分析
★ 印刷電路板產業市場分析與營運績效之研究	★ 台灣地區機車製造業產業分析及營運績效之研究
★ 大陸鋼鐵出口與台灣鋼鐵價格的關聯性	★ 特種貨物及勞務稅對區域房市價格之影響--以桃園縣為例
★ 人口結構變遷對財政教育支出之影響	★ 土壤液化公告對區域房價影響之研究 -以板橋及新莊為例
★ 鶯歌捷運線對房價的影響	★ 中國半鋼子午胎產業分析

檔案

[Endnote RIS 格式]

[Bibtex 格式]

[相關文章]

[文章引用]

[完整記錄]

[館藏目錄]

[檢視]

[下載]

本電子論文使用權限為同意立即開放。
已達開放權限電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的，進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。
請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定，切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送，以免觸法。

摘要(中)

本論文係著重於由硬體與許多軟體種類所組成的系統產品產業，其在需求面的特性為：消費者的購買決策則與軟體種類的多寡有關。本論文分為三個部份探討廠商的最適訂價決策，其標題分別為 “Technology Innovations and Optimal Pricing for Hardware/Software System Products”, “Two-Part Tariff and Average Cost Pricing: The Case of a Monopolistic Amusement Park in Supplying a Variety of Rides”, 以及 “Optimal Trade Policies for Software Exports”。
第一部份係研究一獨占的系統產品廠商在不對稱訊息下針對軟、硬體之最適銷售與訂價決策，並探討其銷售策略如何因需求面與成本面的技術進步而受影響。當技術進步發生於成本面時，獨占廠商將減少採取硬體與所有種類的軟體一同搭售之單一訂價的可能性。而當技術進步係發生於需求面時，則廠商採取硬體與所有軟體一同搭售之單一訂價的可能性將會提高。
第二部份研究一獨占廠商經營遊樂園的最適訂價決策。結果發現，每一種遊樂設施的訂價是在遊樂設施的平均維護成本之水準，此隱含了當遊客人數趨於無窮大時，則最適訂價為採取一票到底的訂價方式。當遊客對於遊樂設施的種類具有高度的愛好時，獨占廠商將會服務整個市場上所有的消費者。
第三部份則從國際貿易的角度探討在一垂直分割的軟硬體系統產品產業下，軟體出口國的最適出口貿易政策。假設有一國外的獨占硬體廠商，除了生產硬體之外，並利用授權的方式開放其硬體技術給兩個軟體開發國家。這些硬體與軟體均出口到第三國市場。結果顯示，若每一種軟體的固定開發成本充分地低且消費者對於所有種類軟體之喜愛程度非常大時，則最適的出口政策為補貼。反之，若每一種軟體的固定開發成本太大，則最適的出口政策為課稅。

摘要(英)

This dissertation focuses on industries of systems products composed of hardware and a variety of software. In this dissertation, I present three essays to address the optimal pricing strategies of a systems product firm. Respectively, the three titles are “Technology Innovations and Optimal Pricing for Hardware/Software System Products”, “Two-Part Tariff and Average Cost Pricing: The Case of a Monopolistic Amusement Park in Supplying a Variety of Rides”, and “Optimal Trade Policies for Software Exports”.
In the first essay, we delineate a hardware/software system product monopolist’s pricing problem under incomplete information. Two possible existing types of optimal (variety-outlay) menus will be shown: a fully pooling menu and a hybrid menu. It was found that a technological improvement on the cost side reduces the possibility of the adoption of a fully pooling menu, while a technological improvement on the demand side increases the possibility of the adoption of a fully pooling menu.
In the second essay, we analyze the optimal pricing of a monopoly amusement park. We find that the park sets the optimal price per ride at the average cost of keeping an amusement facility operating. This implies that charging only a fixed admission fee is optimal when the population of tourists is very large. Further, the park may optimally decide to serve all customers when customers reveal that they are very pleased in experiencing many varieties of rides.
In the third essay, we examine the optimal trade policies of software countries in a vertically-related hardware/software system industry. A foreign hardware monopolist acquires supporting services by licensing its proprietary hardware technology to two third-party software developing countries. All these system products are then exported to a third market. We show that the optimal trade policy of a software exporting country depends on consumers’ preference for variety of software and the cost of software developing. If the developing cost is sufficiently low and the consumers have higher preference for software variety, the government tends to adopt a subsidy. If the developing cost is relatively high, the government will levy a tax on software exporting.

關鍵字(中)

★ 出口政策
★ 遊樂園
★ 系統產品
★ 硬體
★ 軟體

關鍵字(英)

★ export policy
★ amusement park
★ system product
★ software
★ hardware

論文目次

Chapter 1　Introduction
Introduction 1
References 3
Chapter 2 Technology Improvements and Optimal Pricing for Hardware/Software System Products
2.1 Introduction 4
2.2 The Model 6
2.3 The Optimal Menu 7
2.4 The Effects of Technological Advances 9
2.5 Conclusion 12
References 12
Chapter 3 Two-Part Tariff and Average Cost Pricing: The Case of a Monopolistic Amusement Park Supplying a Variety of Rides
3.1 Introduction 14
3.2 The Model 16
3.3 The Demand Functions. 17
3.4 The Monopoly’s Optimal Pricing. 18
3.5 Conclusion. 22
References 23
Chapter 4 Optimal Trade Policies for Software Exports
4.1 Introduction 25
4.2 The Model 27
4.2.1 Consumer Preferences 28
4.2.2 The Demand Functions 29
4.3 Software Price Competition in the Importing Country. 30
4.4 The Hardware Monopolist’s Optimization Problem. 31
4.5 Optimal Export Policies 34
4.6 Conclusion 35
References 36
Appendix 4.1 38
Appendix 4.2 39
Chapter 5 Conclusion 40

參考文獻

Chae, S. (1992), Bundling subscription TV channels: a case of natural bundling, International Journal of Industrial organization, 10, 213-230.
Chou, C. F. and Shy, O. (1990), Network effects without network externalities, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 8, 259-270.
Chou, C. F. and Shy, O. (1993), Partial compatibility and supporting services, Economics Letters, 41, 193-197.
Chou, C. F. and Shy, O. (1996), Do consumers gain or lose when more people buy the same brand, European Journal of Political Economy 12, 309-330.
Lei, D. T. (2000), Industry evolution and competence development: the imperatives of technological convergence, International Journal of Technology Management, 19, 699-738.
Maskin, E. and Riley, J. (1984), Monopoly with incomplete information, Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 171-196.
Nahata, B., Ostaszewski, K. and Sahoo, P. (1999), Buffet pricing, Journal of Business, 72, 215-228.
Shy, O. (2001), The economics of network industries, Cambridge University Press.
Sundararajan, A. (2004), Nonlinear pricing of information goods, Management Science, 50, 1660-1673.
Wilson, R. (1993), Nonlinear pricing, Oxford University Press: New York.
Braun, B. M. and Milman, A. (1994), Demand relations in the Central Florida theme park industry, Annals of Tourism Research, 21, 150-153.
Braun, B. M, Soskin, M.and Cernicky, M. (1992), Central Florida theme park pricing: following the Mouse, Annals of Tourism Research, 19, 131-136.
Braun, B. M. and Soskin, M. (1999), Theme park competitive strategies, Annals of Tourism Research, 26, 438-442.
Braun, B. M. and Soskin, M. (2003), Competitive theme park strategies: Lessons from Central Florida, in Managing Visitor Attractions: New Directions, Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford.
Cassou, Steven. P. and Hause, J. C. (1999), Uniform two-part tariffs and below marginal cost prices: Disneyland revisited, Economic Inquiry, 37, 74-85.
Nahata, B., Ostaszewski, K. and Sahoo, P. K. (1999), Buffet pricing, The Journal of Business, 72, 215-228.
Oi, W. Y. (1971), A Disneyland dilemma: two-part tariffs for a Mickey Mouse monopoly, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85, 77-96.
Phillips, O. and Battalio, R. C. (1983), Two-part tariffs and monopoly profits when visits are variable, Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 601-604.
Schmalensee, R. (1981), Monopolistic two-part pricing arrangements, Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 445-466.
Wu, D. and Liu, N. P. (2007), Why do amusement parks only charge a fixed admission fee?, Economics Letters, 95, 180-185.
Bernhofen, D. M. (1997), Strategic trade policy in a vertically related industry, Review of International Economics, 5, 429-433.
Brander, J. A. and Spencer, B. J. (1985), Export subsidies and international market share rivalry, Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.
Chang, W. W. and Chen, F. Y. (1994), Vertically related markets: export rivalry between DC and LDC firms, Review of International Economics, 2, 131-142.
Chen, H.-Y., Lin, H.-Y. and Chiou, J.-R. (2006), Import polices with network externality, Academic Economic Papers,34, 161-190.
Chou, C. F. and Shy, O. (1990), Network effects without network externalities, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 8, 259-270.
Chou, C. F. and Shy, O. (1993), Partial compatibility and supporting services, Economics Letters, 41, 193-197.
Chou, C. F. and Shy, O. (1996), Do consumers gain or lose when more people buy the same brand, European Journal of Political Economy, 12, 309-330.
Ishikawa, J. and Lee, K. D. (1999), Rent-shifting export subsides with an imported intermediate product, Journal of International Economics, 48, 199-232.
Kumar, Nagesh and Joseph, K. J. (2005), Export of software and business process outsourcing from developing countries: lessons from the Indian experience, Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review, 1, 91-110.
Matutes, C. and Regibeau, P. (1996), A selective review of the economics of standardization: entry deterrence, technological progress and international competition, European Journal of Political Economy, 12, 183-209.
Shy, O. (2001), The economics of network industries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Spencer, B. J. and Jones, R. W. (1991), Vertical foreclosure and international trade policy, Review of Economic Studies, 58, 153-170.
Spencer, B. J. and Jones, R. W. (1992), Trade and protection in vertically related markets,” Journal of International Economics, 32, 31-55.
Yang, Y.-P. and Shih, K.-Y. (2004), Cost differentiation and optimal trade policies in a vertically related industry, Taipei Economic Inquiry, 40, 231-257.
Yang, Y.-P., Wu, S.-J. and Hwang, H. (2002), Production function and optimal trade policy, Academic Economic Papers, 30, 1-27.

指導教授

吳大任(Dachrahn Wu)

審核日期

2009-6-16

推文