參考文獻 |
Chapter 1
[1] Armstrong, M. “Competition in Two-Sided Markets.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37 (2006), pp. 668-691.
[2] Evans, D.S., and Schmalensee, R. “The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms.” Competition Policy International, Vol.3 (2007), pp. 154-179.
[3] Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. “Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation,” The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 16 (1985), pp. 70-83.
[4] Hagiu, A. “Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 18 (2009), pp. 1011-1043.
[5] Katz, M. L. and Shapiro C. “Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 75 (1985), pp. 424-440.
[6] Rochet, J.-C., and Tirole, J. “Two-Sided Markets: a Progress Report.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37 (2006), pp. 645-667.
[7] Rysman, M. “Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 71 (2004), pp. 483-512.
[8] Shy, O. “A Short Survey of Network Economics,” Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 38 (2011), pp. 119-149.
[9] Weyl, G. “A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms.” American Economic Review, Vol. 100 (2010), pp. 1642-1672.
Chapter 2
[1] Ambrus, A. and Argenziano, R. “Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 1 (2009), pp. 17-52.
[2] Armstrong, M. “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37 (2006), pp. 668-691.
[3] Armstrong, M. and Wright, J. “Two-Sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts,” Economic Theory, Vol. 32 (2007), pp. 353-380.
[4] Arthur, W. B. “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lockin by Historical Events” Economic Journal, Vol. 99 (1989), pp. 106-131.
[5] Belleamme, P. and Toulemonde, E. “Negative Intra-Group Externalities in Two-Sided Market,” International Economic Review, Vol. 50 (2009), pp. 245-272.
[6] Burdett, K., Shi, S., and Wright, R. “Pricing and Matching with Frictions,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109 (2001), pp. 1060-1085.
[7] Caillaud, B., and Jullien, B. “Software and the Internet Competing Cybermediaries,” European Economic Review, Vol. 45 (2001), pp. 797-808.
[8] Caillaud, B., and Jullien, B. “Chicken and Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.34 (2003), pp. 309-328.
[9] Coles, M. G., and Eeckhout, J. “Indeterminacy and directed search.” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 111 (2003), pp. 265-276.
[10] Ellison, G., and Fudenberg, D. “Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market
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[11] Ellison, G., and Mobius, M. “Competing Auctions,” Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 2 (2004), pp. 30-66.
[12] Evans, D. S., and Schmalensee, R. “The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms,” Competition Policy International, Vol.3 (2007), pp. 151-179.
[13] Galeotti, A., and Moraga-Gonzalez, J. L. “Platform Intermediation in a Market for Differentiated Products,” European Economic Review, Vol. 53 (2009), pp. 417-428.
[14] Guthrie, G., and Wright, J. “Competing Payment Schemes,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 55 (2007), pp. 37-67.
[15] Hagiu, A. “Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 18 (2009), pp. 1011-1043.
[16] Jullien, B. “Price Skewness and Competition in Multi-Sided Markets,” Working Paper. (2008).
[17] Kultti, K. “Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices.” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 27 (1999), pp. 106-113.
[18] Kultti, K. “Comparison of Auctions and Posted Prices in a Finite Random Matching Model.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 159 (2003), pp. 457-67.
[19] Montgomery, J. D. “Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Inter-industry Wage Differentials,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106 (1991), pp. 163-179.
[20] Moscarini, G., and Wright, R. “Introduction to Search Theory and Applications,” Journal of the Economic Theory, Vol. 145 (2010), pp. 1319-1324.
[21] Peters, M. “Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States.,” Econometrica, Vol. 59 (1991), pp. 1425-1454.
[22] Rochet, J.-C., and Tirole, J. “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Journal of the European Economics Association, Vol. 1 (2003), pp. 990-1029.
[23] Rochet, J.-C., and Tirole, J. “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37 (2006), pp. 645-667.
[24] Rochet, J.-C., and Tirole, J. “Tying in Two-Sided Markets and the Honor All Cards Rule,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 26 (2008), pp. 1333-1347.
[25] Rysman, M. “Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages,” Reviews of Economic Studies, Vol. 71 (2004), pp. 483-512.
[26] Rysman, M. “The Economics of Two-Sided Markets,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3 (2009), pp. 125-143.
[27] Watanabe, M. “A model of merchants.” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 145 (2010), pp. 1865-1889.
[28] Weyl, G. “The Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms,” American Economic Review, Vol. 100 (2010), pp. 1642-1672.
Chapter 3
[1] Arnold, M., Li, C., Saliba, C., and Zhang L. “Asymmetric Market Shares, Advertising and Pricing: Equilibrium with an Information Gatekeeper,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 59 (2011), pp. 63-84.
[2] Ancarani, F. and Shankar, V. “Price Levels and Price Dispersion Within and Across Multiple Retailer Types: Further Evidence and Extension,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol. 32 (2004), pp. 176187.
[3] Anderson, S. P., and de Palma, A. “The Logit as a Model of Product Differentiation,” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 44 (1992), pp. 5167.
[4] Anderson, S. P., and de Palma, A. “Product Diversity in Asymmetric Oligopoly: Is the Quality of Consumer Goods Too Low?” The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 49 (2001), pp. 113135.
[5] Baye, M. R. and Morgan, J. “Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 91 (2001), pp. 454-474.
[6] Brynjolfsson, E., Hu, Y., and Rahman, M. S. “Battle of the Retail Channels: How Product Selection and Geography Drive Cross-Channel Competition?” Management Science, Vol. 55 (2009), pp. 1755-1765.
[7] Brynjolfsson, E., and Smith, M. D. “Frictionless commerce? A comparison of Internet and conventional retailers,” Management Science, Vol. 46 (2000), pp. 563-585.
[8] Chun, S.-H., Rhee, B.-D., Park, S. Y. and Kim, J.-C. “Emerging Dual Channel System and Manufacturer’’s Direct Retail Channel Strategy,” International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 20 (2011), pp. 812-825.
[9] Ellison, G. and Fisher Ellison, S. “Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet,” Econometrica, Vol. 77 (2009), pp. 427-452.
[10] Forman, C., Ghose A., and Goldfarb A. “Competition Between Local and Electronic Markets: How the Benefit of Buying Online Depends on Where You Live,” Management Science, Vol. 55 (2009), pp. 47-57.
[11] Goldfarb, A., and Tucker, C. “Substitution between Offline and Online Advertising Markets,” Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol.7 (2011), pp. 437-444.
[12] Viswanathan S. “Competing Across Technology-Differentiated Channels: The Impact of Network Externalities and Switching Costs,” Management Science, Vol. 51 (2005), pp. 483-496.
Chapter 4
[1] Ambrus, A., and Argenziano, R. “Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 1 (2009), pp. 17-52.
[2] Armstrong, M. “Competition in Two-Sided Markets.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37 (2006), pp. 668-691.
[3] Armstrong, M., and Wright, J. “Two-Sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts.” Economic Theory, Vol. 32 (2007), pp. 353-380.
[4] Belleamme, P., and Toulemonde, E. “Negative Intra-Group Externalities in Two-Sided Markets.” International Economic Review, Vol. 50 (2009), pp. 245-272.
[5] Belleamme, P., and Peitz, M. “Platform Competition and Seller Investment Incentives.” European Economic Review, Vol. 54 (2010), pp. 1059-1076.
[6] Caillaud, B., and Jullien, B. “Software and the Internet Competing Cybermediaries.” European Economic Review, Vol. 45 (2001), pp. 797-808.
[7] Caillaud, B., and Jullien, B. “Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34 (2003), pp. 309-328.
[8] Chen, K.-P., and Huang, Y.-C. “A Search-Matching Model of the Buyer-Seller Platforms.” Working paper, National Taiwan University and National Central University, Taiwan, 2012.
[9] Choi, J.-P. “Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing.” The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 58 (2010), pp. 607-626.
[10] Church, J., and King, I. “Bilingualism and network externalities.” Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 26 (1993), pp. 337 345.
[11] Damiano, E., and Li, H. “Competing Matchmaking.” Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 6 (2008), pp. 789-818.
[12] Doganoglu, T., and Wright, J. “Multihoming and compatibility.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 24 (2006) pp. 45-67.
[13] Doganoglu, T., and Wright, J. “Exclusive Dealing with Network Effects.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 28 (2010) pp. 145-154.
[14] Evans, D.S., Hagiu, A., and Schmalensee, R. “A Survey of the Economic Role of Software Platforms in Computer-based Industries” CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 51 (2005), pp. 189-224.
[15] Evans, D.S., and Schmalensee, R. “The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms.” Competition Policy International, Vol. 3 (2007), pp. 154-179.
[16] Farrell, J., and Saloner, G. “Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncement, and Predation.” American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (1986), pp. 940-955.
[17] Guthrie, G., and Wright, J. “Competing Payment Schemes.” The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 55 (2007), pp. 37-67.
[18] Galeotti, A and Moraga-Gonzalez, J.L. “Platform intermediation in a market for differentiated products.” European Economic Review, Vol. 53 (2009), pp. 417-428.
[19] Hagiu, A. “Pricing and Commitment by Two-Sided Platforms.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37 (2006), pp. 720-737.
[20] Hagiu, A. “Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 18 (2009), pp. 1011-1043.
[21] Katz, M.L., and Shapiro, C. “Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility.” American Economic Review, Vol. 75 (1985), pp. 424-40.
[22] Rochet, J.-C., and Tirole, J. “Cooperation among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33 (2002), pp. 549-570.
[23] Rochet, J.-C., and Tirole, J. “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets.” Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1 (2003), pp. 990-1029.
[24] Rochet, J.-C., and Tirole, J. “Two-Sided Markets: a Progress Report.” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37 (2006), pp. 645-667.
[25] Rochet, J.-C., and Tirole, J. “Tying in Two-Sided Markets and the Honor All Cards Rule.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 26 (2008), pp. 1333-1347.
[26] Rysman, M. “The Economics of Two-Sided Markets.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 23 (2009), pp. 125-143.
[27] Weyl, G. “A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms.” American Economic Review, Vol. 100 (2010), pp. 1642-1672.
[28] White, A., and Weyl, G. “Insulated Platform Competition.” Working paper. Harvard University and TSE, 2012.
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