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姓名 莊涴婷(Wan-Ting Chuang) 查詢紙本館藏 畢業系所 工業管理研究所 論文名稱 兩家廠商間價格與品質的競爭
(Price and quality competition between two retailers)相關論文 檔案 [Endnote RIS 格式]
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摘要(中) 近年來,品質管理的領域出現各種理論,讓品質管理的內涵越來越豐富,對企業來說,做好品質管理將有助於提升利潤,再者顧客買一項產品除了顧及價格高低外,更去在乎品質的水準,我們可以發現訂價策略並非是唯一的決策,所以我們考慮以品質水準當成決策變數,因此在模型中,價格和品質水準會是我們的決策變數。在研究中,我們會先提出一個保留價格的概念,因為每個人對一項產品的認知價格不同,所以廠商只能知道保留價格的分配,這個保留價格分配會受到廠商的訂價與品質水準而變動;在這個架構下,我們將會先提出一個基本的模型,整個市場只有一家廠商,在沒有任何的競爭下,廠商如何訂價與品質水準會使得廠商的利潤會最大;之後再提出整個市場有兩家廠商彼此競爭,直到雙方達到Nash均衡訂出價格與品質水準使得雙方皆沒有再偏離該均衡的意願。最後,我們將設計一個數值例子與分析各個參數對模型的影響。
摘要(英) In recent years, the literature in operations management has seen a dramatic surge in articles on quality management. It reflects the increased emphasis on quality which has been attributed largely to make a profit. Furthermore, consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality levels. We can find that pricing decisions for sellers are not only the most crucial factor in industries. Hence, we take quality levels into consideration in the model. In this study, we propose a reservation price distribution affected by the selling price and quality levels of the product. Under this structure, we show the basic model with one firm in determining its price and quality levels to maximize profits without any competition. Moreover, two firms compete in determining their price and quality levels to maximize their profits and find the decisions of price and quality levels in Nash equilibrium for both firms, respectively. Finally, we find some observations from the numerical examples and show the sensitivity analysis on parameters.
關鍵字(中) ★ 保留價格
★ 價格與品質的競爭
★ 非合作賽局關鍵字(英) ★ Non-cooperative game
★ Price and quality competition
★ Reservation price論文目次 Content
Abstract i
Content iii
List of Figures iv
List of Tables v
1.Introduction 1
1.1 Background/Motivation 1
1.2 Research objective 2
2. Literature Review 3
2.1 Reservation price 3
2.2 Non-cooperative game 4
2.3 Price and quality competition 6
3. The Model 8
3.1 Demand function and notation 8
3.2 The basic model with one firm 10
3.3 The model with a price and quality-based competition between two firms 11
4. Numerical Example 14
4.1 The numerical results of the basic model with one firm 14
4.2 The numerical results of the competition between two firms 15
4.3 Analysis of numerical example from one firm to two firms 15
4.4 Analysis of reservation price of customers 17
4.5 Analysis of cost of quality improvement 20
4.6 Substitutability and competitive level 23
4.7 Analysis of quality sensitivity 25
5. Conclusion and Future Research 29
References 31
參考文獻 References
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13.Nelson, P., 1970, “Information and consumer behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 78, 311-329.
14.Nobuo, M., and Yoshiyasu, Y., 2007, “A note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms,” European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 187, 571-581.
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19.Salinger, A., and R. Michael, 1985, “A graphical analysis of bundling,” Journal of Business, Vol. 3, 85-98.
20.Tellis, G., and D. Wemerfelt, 1987, “Competitive price and quality under asymmetric information,” Marketing Science, Vol. 6, 240-253.
21.Tyagi, R.K., 2000, “Sequential product positioning under differential costs,” Marketing Science, Vol. 46, 928-940.
指導教授 曾富祥(Fu-Shiang Tseng) 審核日期 2010-6-23 推文 plurk
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