行銷因子與競爭條件下之最佳產銷決策; Optimal decisions for manufacturer-retailer channels with promotion and retail competition

NCUIR > School of Management at National Central University > Graduate Institute of Industrial Management > Electronic Thesis & Dissertation > Item 987654321/11089

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/11089

Title:	行銷因子與競爭條件下之最佳產銷決策;Optimal decisions for manufacturer-retailer channels with promotion and retail competition
Authors:	谷春芸;Chun-Yun Ku
Contributors:	工業管理研究所
Keywords:	退貨政策;零售競爭;賽局理論;retail competition;return policy;promotion
Date:	2004-06-16
Issue Date:	2009-09-22 14:13:40 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學圖書館
Abstract:	以往製造商為了要分擔風險而提供零售商退貨的機制，希望能刺激零售商的訂購量，進而使自己的利潤增加。所以製造商的退貨政策會影響到零售商的定價及訂購量。但隨著零售商的競爭壓力下，不論是零售商改善本身的服務品質或是促銷自己的商品，都希望能增加需求而達到市場效應。所以本文主要是以Stackelberg賽局理論為架構，假設製造商為領導者(leader)提供退貨政策，而零售商為追隨者(follower)且零售商會因為市場效應而使需求增加的情形下，找到最佳的決策變數後，製造商再來決定最佳的退貨政策，以期使自己的利潤為最大。本研究是以製造商的最大利潤為目的，但是也考慮到零售商彼此競爭的結果下，是否在需求有市場效應的影響下，會使彼此的利潤降低而造成囚犯的困境。而對製造商而言他的退貨政策是否可以改善此種困境，使雙方都獲利。 Under a return policy with promotion and retail competition ，manufacturer’s returns policies are common feature in the distribution of many products。 The obvious rational for returns policies is insurance， we study the strategic effect of returns policies on retail promotion and highlight manufacturer’s profit。 We assume that the retailer’s demand is increasing in marketing effect but the returns are diminishing which demand is assumed to be exponentially distributed。 We extend the return policies to a case in which retailer has competitive situation。 It’s occurs prisoner’s dilemma when they have strategic interaction。 We show that, under a return policy with retail promotion， which manufacturer’s profit better then no return policy and prisoner’s dilemma is also improved。
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Industrial Management] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

Files in This Item:

File	Size	Format

社群 sharing

Loading...