新產品初進入通路中販售時會存在一定時間產銷雙方對新產品資訊的不對稱，實務上及相關之研究會建議零售商可向製造商收取部份的 「上架費」(Slotting Allowance，或稱為新產品推廣費)，上架費的機制能夠適切地解決貨架空間有限下零售商對製造商之商品的選擇，此一機制稱為上架費的篩選(Screening)功能。雖然上架費之使用在實務界是很普及的，但是較少以通路管理之領域來探討。因此，本研究著重在通路管理與協調的觀點來出發，希冀闡釋上架費在通路中使用之方式和管理意涵。本研究旨在探討通路上、下游的協調產生互惠的局面，並將研究主軸放在上架費機制在單期模式、兩階層通路結構中的功能與其對整體通路的影響做為本文的核心，以及是否能產生通路中成員的利益增進乃至擴大為顧客利益的增進為延伸目的。 Asymmetric information of new products always exists when introduced into the market while selling, mechanism of slotting allowance can aid retailer solving selecting manufacturers' salable goods under insufficient shelf spaces appropriately and practically. This mechanism is called ‘Screening’ function of slotting allowance. Though mechanism of slotting allowance itself is often a topic probed into in marketing and is mostly concerning public policy (antitrust), fewer research had conferred with channel management field, but quite available at practical applications in actually. Thus, this thesis focused on channel management and collaboration endeavoring to managerial insights of implementing of slotting allowance in channel. In this thesis we extend the channel coordination literature by investigating the case of a manufacturer that sells to independents retailers who directly compete for customers. This thesis aims at probing into channel collaboration during reciprocal (or benefit one side at least) situation, then constructs a model in a system of newsboy, two-level channel structure .Whether to promote interests in channel and enlarge customer benefits regarded as extended purpose.
