雖然供應鏈管理至今已經被廣泛且深入地探討，然而大部分的文獻均假設其供應鏈成員為風險中立者。實務上，供應鏈成員對風險可能有不同的感受，基於這個理由，我們結合供應鏈成員的風險喜好與具推式合約的報童模型。 在推式合約中，零售商必須在銷售季節前預估需求並訂購產品，因此也承擔了整個供應鏈的存貨風險。所以我們考慮零售商為風險中立者或風險趨避者來分析此報童模型。當零售商為風險趨避者時，我們深入討論兩種情況，情況一為供應商做決策時不知道零售商為風險趨避者；情況二為供應商知道零售商為風險趨避者。我們想要了解零售商在情況一下之最佳訂購量與情況二下之最佳訂購量的關係，還有零售商之風險喜好的資訊是否影響供應商的利潤。 我們發現情況一下之零售商最佳訂購量會少於當零售商為風險中立者時的最佳訂購量，但卻大於情況二下之零售商最佳訂購量。還有，當零售商為風險趨避者時，知道此資訊的供應商會比不知道此資訊的供應商得到較多利潤。我們也提供一份清單，顯示情況一下零售商的最佳訂購數量與其風險趨避參數的關係，來幫助供應商藉由對照此表來得知零售商對風險的感受程度。 Although the supply chain management has been discussed generally and in depth, most of them are considered the agents in the supply chain risk neutral. In the practice, the supplier and retailer may have different attitudes toward risk. For this reason, we incorporate risk preference into the newsvendor model with a push contract. In a push contract, the retailer orders the entire supply before the selling season and bears all of the supply chain’s inventory risk. We analyze the (newsvendor) model by considering the retailer’s attitude toward risk, which is risk neutrality or risk aversion. If the retailer is risk averse, we further analyze two cases. In Case 1, the supplier makes a decision without knowing the retailer’s risk preference, and in Case 2, we consider the opposite situation that the supplier knows the retailer’s risk attitude and makes the corresponding decision. We want to realize the relationship between the retailer’s optimal order quantities in Case 1 and the ones in Case 2, and whether the information of the retailer’s risk attitude affects the supplier’s profit. We find out that the retailer’s optimal order quantity in Case 1 is smaller than the optimal order quantity as the retailer is risk neutral but bigger than the optimal order quantity in Case 2. Furthermore, the supplier facing a risk-averse retailer gets more profit if he knows the retailer’s risk preference. We also provide a menu to show the relationship between the retailer’s optimal order quantity and risk-averse parameter to help the supplier making a better decision.
