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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/11405


    Title: 存貨合作機制下零售商之訂價策略;Pricing Strategies of Retailers under Inventory Cooperated Mechanism
    Authors: 蔡智傑;Chih-chieh Tsai
    Contributors: 工業管理研究所
    Keywords: 存貨分享;雙頭壟斷寡占;替代率;供應鏈競爭;Inventory Sharing;Duopoly;Substitutability;Supply Chain Competition
    Date: 2009-07-01
    Issue Date: 2009-09-22 14:20:50 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學圖書館
    Abstract: 有鑑於世界經濟不景氣,各產業的供應鏈成員面臨極大的挑戰。不僅必須面對上游供應商資源的不穩定,下游顧客的需求量也難以捉摸。供應鏈成員需要找出更能彈性的方法來面對這些情況所造成的危機。從3C賣場中可發現,不同的零售商以不同的售價銷售相同的產品。然而當缺貨時,零售商會向其他零售商先行調貨來滿足需求,但是仍以原先承諾的價格銷售給顧客。本文將此種機制以數學模型加以建構,探討兩供應商雖為競爭對手,但可利用此種存貨合作的機制提高本身的彈性。在不增加存貨風險的情況下,同時降低缺貨的風險。利用這個數學模型,我們將站在零售商的角度找出在有存貨合作時,最佳的訂購以及訂價策略。在模型部份,我們先利用替代率的線性價格需求函式建構出兩供應商寡占競爭的架構,再以競爭架構加上存貨合作的機制,求出在存貨合作下的另一個Nash equilibrium。我們將比較兩個均衡的不同之處,並且分析各參數對此模型的影響。在本文的最後,我們將設計一個範例以證明在某些情況之下,與其零售商與對手進行削價競爭,不如利用存貨合作的合作策略來達成一個雙贏的局面。 Under global economic recession, supply chain agents in all kinds of industries are urgent to find some solutions in order to survive. By observing the 3C markets, we propose a cooperation between retailers by inventory sharing. With inventory cooperation, retailers may earn more profit and reduce the cost of inventory. In this study, we model this kind of policy and figure the optimal ordering and pricing strategies for both retailers under inventory cooperation. We model a duopoly competitive environment with two retailers, and find the decisions of pricing and ordering in Nash equilibrium for both retailers, respectively. Furthermore, we consider a possibility of adding the inventory cooperation in our model. As the result, another Nash equilibrium can be founded. We compare these two Nash equilibriums and figure out the range of the flowing price that will make the sharing policy profitable. We show that if our retailers avoid the price competition, there will be a chance that both retailers benefit more by the inventory cooperated mechanism.
    Appears in Collections:[工業管理研究所 ] 博碩士論文

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