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    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/11876


    題名: 新股承銷價低估及期初異常報酬與續後現金增資關係研究--以台灣股市實證--;An empirical relation between IPO underpricing , initial abnormal return and subsequent equity offerings
    作者: 郭宗皓;Chung-Hao Kuo
    貢獻者: 財務金融研究所
    關鍵詞: 承銷價低估;期初異常報酬;現金增資;underpricing;abnormal return;seo
    日期: 2001-06-29
    上傳時間: 2009-09-22 14:34:11 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 國立中央大學圖書館
    摘要: 國內、外的新上市股票皆有異常報酬率,許多學者認為此現象可歸因於承銷價格被低估所致,Allen&Faulhaber(1989)、Welch(1989)、Grinblatt &Hwang(1989)利用資訊不對稱來解釋「承銷價格低估的訊息發射理論」,認為品質佳的公司利用承銷價低估向投資大眾宣達其經營品質,待上市後投資人瞭解公司的實際品質時,品質佳的公司,即可以較高的價格辦理現金增資,故新股的折價程度是續後辦理增資的重要資訊,而由於折價發行,必須支付成本,品質差的公司,因可能無法於上市後辦理現金增資彌補成本,故不會在新上市時折價發行,即市場是處於「區別均衡」(Separating Equilibrium)的型態,Jegadeesh、Weinstein&Welch(1993)提出「市場回饋價說」認為引發公司上市後短期內辦理現金增資的動機是上市後股價表現優異,而非承銷價格的低估程度。 本研究以民國81年至87年間新上市公司為樣本,利用Logit及OLS模型測試承銷價格低估程度及新股上市初期的異常報酬率對續後辦理現金增資之間的關聯性,另外分別以資產報酬率、稅後淨利及現金流量比率代表公司營運品質的績效衡量指標,來瞭解台灣新上市股票市場所處的均衡型態,來做折價之訊息測試,實證結果如下: 1.新股上市初期承銷價格低估程度及上市初期異常報酬與續後增資機率 呈不顯著負相關,顯示折價程度高的公司續後增資機率較低。 2.新股上市初期承銷價格低估程度及上市初期異常報酬與續後增資速度 呈不顯著負相關,表示折價程度高的公司續後增資速度越慢。 3.新股上市初期承銷價格低估程度及上市初期異常報酬與續後增資規模 呈不顯著正相關,表示國內市場有承銷價低估程度高的公司續後辦理增資規模越大之趨勢。 4.上市後各年之績效衡量指標皆呈下滑趨勢,而上市後兩年內有辦理增資公司的績效表現並未顯著優於兩年內未增資的公司。 5.新股上市初期承銷價格低估程度較高並增資的公司,上市後各年的績效衡量指標並未較承銷價低估程度低且無增資的公司及承銷價低估程度低但增資的公司佳,顯示台灣新上市股票市場並非處區別均衡而是混合均衡。 Abstract Due to the “information asymmetry” between issuers and investors.so some papers present “Signaling hypothesis” that high-quality firms underprice their IPOs to distinguish from themselves from low-quality firms.After IPO investors will find out which firms are real high-quality.Those company can raise additional capital in more favorable terms that is what we call “SEO”.The “Signaling theory” implies that underpricing will be positively related to the firms’ SEO. Jegadeesh,Weinstein&Welch present the “Market feedback hypothesis”. They think that the high returns in a period after the IPO imply that issuers have underestimated the marginal return to the project. So the reason caused the IPO companies to issue seasoned issuesis the cumulated abnormal return not the underpriceing. Because the cost of signaling to underpricing is high, low-quality firms will not do the discount to the IPOs.There is obviously the “Separating Equilibrium” in the initial offerings market. This thesis would analyze the relation between underpricing and SEO probability、speed、scale…And test the“Market feedback hypothesis”.Besides that I also want to test the ralation between underpricing and performance ,and find Taiwan initial public market is belong “Separating equilibrium” or “Pooling equilibrium” The results of the thesis are : 1.IPOs with higher underpricing and initial cumulated abnormal return are less likely to issue seasoned equity than firms with lower underpricing and initial cumulated abnormal return. 2.IPOs with higher underpricing and initial cumulated abnormal return are less quickly to issue seasoned equity than firms with lower underpricing initial cumulated abnormal return. 3. IPOs with higher underpricing and initial cumulated abnormal return are likely to issue larger amounts of seasoned equity 4.The performance after IPO in companies with SEO is not higher than those without reissuing within 2 years. 5.The performance after IPO in companies with high underpricing and reissuing is no better than those with low underpricing and non-reissuing ,and those with low underpricing and reissuing.so Taiwan IPO market is belong to 「Pooling Equilibrium」not 「Separating Equilibrium」
    顯示於類別:[財務金融研究所] 博碩士論文

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