立法院在民國89年及90年分別通過金融機構合併法及金融控股公司法，希望能透過同業合併或異業跨業經營改善銀行業目前過度競爭、資產品質惡化導致獲利能力下降的問題。由於國內銀行業同業構併案例尚且不多，且金融控股公司方在起步階段，本研究希冀透過瞭解銀行對同業及異業轉投資行為與策略，提供銀行未來發展方向之參考。又銀行之決策能否提昇銀行價值，決定於銀行治理機制之完善與否，故本研究旨在檢視銀行轉投資行為、治理機制對經營績效之影響。 根據本文的實證結果顯示，在民國87~89年三年間，銀行轉投資於同業子公司之績效明顯優於異業子公司，在轉投資風險方面，則以異業子公司之風險較高。銀行轉投資於同業之投資金額較為集中，同業投資金額佔淨值比也較高，不過持股比率方面則以對異業之持股比率較高。 在轉投資行為對銀行經營績效之影響方面，銀行轉投資在同業子公司之績效愈佳，銀行之ROA、ROE、市價淨值比、RAROC、非利息管理效率及效率比率皆有較佳之表現。銀行轉投資愈集中在同業或異業某一類時，銀行之ROA、市價淨值比、RAROC之表現皆較差。而銀行對同業之轉投資愈集中在某幾家公司而非均勻分散時，銀行之市價淨值比和利息管理效率的表現都較差。在持股比率方面，當銀行在同業轉投資上採取較高比率持股之轉投資策略，其ROA、ROE、市價淨值比、非利息管理效率及效率比率都有較佳之表現。 在治理機制及其他中介變數對銀行經營績效之影響方面，當股權偏離程度愈大時，銀行之ROA、ROE、市價淨值比、RAROC、利息管理效率、非利息管理效率和效率比率之表現都較差。顯示當銀行之股權愈偏離，愈有發生代理問題之道德危機。而銀行之放款市佔率愈高，則市價淨值比有愈佳之表現，顯示銀行之規模與知名度將有助於市場之評價。 With the trend of deregulation and internationalization, Taiwan has just passed the law to allow bank mergers and conglomeration of the financial institutions. Due to lack of sufficient examples of bank mergers, and the financial holding companies (FHCs) in Taiwan has just founded, this thesis aims to find out the impact of the strategy and activities of the banks’ equity investment in banking and other financial sectors to banks’ performance. Furthermore, a bank’s directors are the final determiner for loans and management decisions. A healthy corporate governance system is the prerequisite for a bank to maximize its shareholders’ value. This thesis uses OLS model to evaluate how equity investment and corporate governance system affect banks performance. According to the empirical results, banks get better performance when they invest in banking companies with higher profitability and when they own more stakes in banking companies. When banks’ HHIs of equity investment and equity investment in banking companies are higher, banks’ performance is worse. While considering the impact of corporate governance system to banks’ performance, we find that banks’ performance is significantly negative related to 「final director proportion/ controlled stakes.」It is said that when banks’ ownership structure diverge from「one stake, one right」, banks tend to have worse financial performance. Banks with more 「loans with related parties」also have worse financial performance. It is proved that a healthy corporate governance system is the prerequisite to maximize shareholders’ value of a bank.
