檢視Basu的盈餘不對稱時效性模型在台灣金融服務業的適用性; Examining the Effectiveness of Basu（1997）Measure on Taiwan's Financial Institutions

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Title:	檢視Basu的盈餘不對稱時效性模型在台灣金融服務業的適用性;Examining the Effectiveness of Basu（1997）Measure on Taiwan's Financial Institutions
Authors:	李容嫺;Jung-Shian Lee
Contributors:	財務金融研究所
Keywords:	資訊揭露;穩健性;多角化;治理機制;Diversification;Information disclosure;Conservatism;Government mechanism
Date:	2007-06-26
Issue Date:	2009-09-22 14:41:30 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學圖書館
Abstract:	本研究分為兩篇文章，第一篇為「盈餘穩健性、市價淨值比與治理機制－台灣金融服務業之實證研究」，第二篇為「資訊揭露與多角化經營會否提升金融服務業之盈餘穩健度」。第一篇旨在探討1991至2004間我國上市櫃金融機構的會計盈餘能否穩健表達，係以Basu（1997）的盈餘不對稱時效性模型，衡量盈餘的穩健性，並藉著納入市價淨值比及治理機制，更嚴謹地觀察穩健表達的變化。實證結果可歸納為下列三點：第一，金融機構的會計盈餘具備穩健性，符合穩健經營的假說；第二，探討盈餘穩健特性時，雖可藉由市價淨值比的納入，減少資訊傳遞時的雜訊干擾，惟因產業特性之故，造成市價淨值比對其影響不大。第三，治理機制明顯降低盈餘的穩健表達，其中尤以與內部人持股有關的董監事持股比率及質押比率最為顯著，意味高階金融主管仍不排斥透過盈餘操縱，改變財務報表的穩健表達。第二篇則繼續使用Basu（1997）的盈餘不對稱時效性模型，探討在2001年之後，我國上市櫃金融機構的盈餘穩健情形。實證結果可歸納為下列四點：第一，我國金融業在2001年以後，可能存在過度使用穩健原則的情形。第二，我國資訊揭露評鑑系統的成立，的確可使盈餘更合理表達其穩健特性，然因評比項目多為強制性的揭露事項，使高低資訊揭露程度並無顯著的差別。第三，我國金融機構為擴展經營規模，而從事不同的多角化行為，將導致穩健原則的採用程度隨之有異。第四，治理機制的施行，可降低財務報表的扭曲程度，使穩健性合理陳述，然因公司個別情況有異，盈餘穩健性亦隨之不同，可見我國現行的法令規章，仍留給公司相當的自主性。 This thesis includes two studies. One is “Earnings Conservatism, Market-to-Book Ratio, and Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Financial Institutions in Taiwan.” The other is “Do Information Disclosure and Diversification Increase Earnings Conservatism of Financial Institutions in Taiwan?” The purpose of the first one paper is to examine earnings conservatism of Taiwan's financial institutions over 1991-2004. First, we use Basu (1997) to evaluate earnings conservatism. Secondly, we add market-to-book ratio (MTB) and governance mechanism to Basu in sequence, enable our analysis more rigorous. The findings are as follows: (1) The earnings of Taiwan's financial institutions conform to conservatism. (2) Because our sample is financial institutions, MTB affects earnings conservatism slightly. (3) Governance mechanism reduces earnings conservatism obviously, especially the variables related to the stock held by insiders, the ratio of the stock held by directors and supervisors and equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors. It means executive management may change earnings conservatism by earnings manipulations. The second paper is to examine earnings conservatism of Taiwan's financial institutions after 2001. The main findings are as follows: (1) Taiwan's financial institutions possibly overuse conservatism after 2001. (2) The implementation of information disclosure and evaluation system indeed causes the expression of earnings conservatism more reasonable. However, the difference between "high disclosure" and "low disclosure" companies is not statistically significant. (3) Because Taiwan's financial institutions have different diversification, their earnings conservatism are also different. (4) Government mechanism may reduce the distortion of financial report. As a result, companies can use conservatism more reasonable. However, earnings conservatism would change according to the situation of company individually.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Finance] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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