本研究探討配股法規的改變對申請配股公司盈餘管理方式之影響，並進一步檢視中國上市公司配股後之營運績效。本研究亦檢視申請配股成功公司與失敗公司於申請後之營運績效表現，以探討中國證監會篩選申請配股公司的能力是否逐年提昇。現有文獻缺少探討2001年中國配股新法規之後，申請配股公司之盈餘管理及其營運績效，亦缺少探討2001年配股新法規通過後，中國證監會監督及篩選申請公司之能力。因此，本研究按新法規變革分成三個期間，以檢視其申請配股公司盈餘管理及其營運績效。 實證結果顯示，主營業利潤低之配股公司，於發行配股後之營運績效顯著低於配對公司，而主營業利潤高之配股公司，於發行配股後之營運績效與配對公司並無顯著差異。此外，證券法規對公司的盈餘管理方式有所影響。藉由比較申請配股成功公司與失敗公司，本研究發現在1998與1999-2000這兩個區間，中國證監會監督能力提昇。然而在2001年法規要求變得更加嚴峻後，中國上市公司盈餘管理方式改變，使得中國證監會拒絕部份體質良好的公司，因此，失敗公司的營運績效反而優於申請成功公司，其實證結果顯示中國證監會監督能力降低。 The objective of this study is to examine whether the rights offerings firms with low (high) profits from main operations may underperform (outperform) the matched firms. Because the regulations have tremendous influence on the earnings management behaviors, we conjecture that changes on rights offerings regulations will affect firms’ earnings management devices. In this study, we will examine whether the Chinese regulators’ ability to scrutinize firms continue to improve over time, especially after the change of rights offering regulation in 2001. Finally, we investigate the operating performance between firms obtaining rights offerings and firms applying for but failing to receive the approval. The empirical results indicate that firms which used earnings management devices to boost their earnings to achieve the requirements of regulation before the rights offerings. We also find that in the post-offering period, firms with low profits from main operations underperform the matched firms. This study finds that the operating performance of the successful firms after the issuing year is significantly higher than that of failed firms during 1998 and 1999-2000. However, the firms obtaining rights offerings have underperformed the failed firms during the period of 2001-2004. The evidence suggests that the supervision ability of regulators appears to deteriorate in the sub-sample period of 2001-2004.
