本篇論文研究1997至2007年期間，共1119樣本數，在美國股票市場宣告增資發行新股事件時，發行者的宣告效果對其競爭者、上下游廠商的市場反應。假說架構分為資訊不對稱、成長投資機會、以及資本結構假說。結果發現當公司宣告增資發行新股時，競爭者以及上下游產業皆呈現顯著負向反應，顯示競爭效果強度大於傳染效果。在成長投資機會假說和資本結構假說下,發現競爭者的異常報酬顯著為負。在子樣本檢定中，本篇發現下游廠商對高公司市價淨值比的發行者有異常報酬顯著為負的反應，主要原因是高市價淨值比的發行者資訊不對稱程度較大。發行者宣告增資發行新股後所發射的成長投資機會訊息，與降低違約風險的資本結構改善雖然使上游廠商有正的報酬，但是另一方面，發行者在公司擴張導致對上游廠商需求提高，以及資本結構改善後對其的議價能力提升使上游廠商正的累積異常報酬被抵銷。所以整體而言，上游廠商對於發行者宣告增資發行新股的效果為強烈負的異常報酬。 This paper uses a sample of 1119 seasoned equity offering (SEO) events from 1997 to 2007 to examine the effect of SEO announcement on rivals of the issuers, and on price reaction in customer and supplier industries. During different windows, all reactions we get are all significantly negative. We obtain results that the announcement will signal industry-wide negative information so that the rivals and customers will be negatively affected. The sub-sample result of rivals does not provide an evidence to support information asymmetry, but competitive effect is strong under growth investment opportunity and capital structure hypotheses. The negative CAR to the customers mainly derives from high price to book of the issuers because of more severe information asymmetry problem. The abnormal return to the suppliers is strong negative because the benefits on increase of material demand and decrease on issuer’s default rates are offset by the bargaining power of issuer.
