本研究探討中國證券商與基金管理公司的關係是否會影響分析師的盈餘預測行為。多數中國大型證券商或是金融集團，同時設有研究部門以及投資銀行部門，並且擁有基金管理子公司或是對基金管理公司擁有控制權；同時，基金管理公司亦是證券公司經紀業務的主要客戶。現有文獻鮮少探討中國分析師的利益衝突，同時亦缺乏文獻針對證券商與基金管理公司間的關係，是否會對分析師產生利益衝突進行研究。因此，本文以2003年至2007年為研究期間，探討分析師是否會配合與所屬證券商有關之共同基金調整持股時點，策略性發布偏誤預測，以協助共同基金獲取好績效。 實證結果顯示，相較於其他與基金管理公司無關係的分析師，與基金公司同屬一個金融集團的關係分析師，並不會在共同基金欲調整持股時，發布偏誤預測以幫助共同基金獲取較好的績效表現。相反的，我們發現當共同基金調升持股時有關係分析師的盈餘預測較無關係分析師樂觀。另一方面，本研究發現承銷商所屬分析師，亦會在公司進行首次發行、增發或配股後一季發布偏頗預測，以協助共同基金以較高價格賣出其持股或在公開市場上以較低價格購入股份，以獲得較好績效。 This study aims to examine whether relation between security companies and mutual funds in China would have influence on analysts’ behavior. Since large security companies or financial services groups in China often own or control an investment banking subsidiary, a fund management subsidiary, and the research department, we conjecture that related analysts in the research department could issue biased forecasts to help related mutual fund perform well. Affiliated analysts could also strategically use biased forecast to benefit their major client. We find that related analysts do not issue biased forecasts when mutual funds change holding of shares to help mutual funds earn higher return. Instead, related analysts’ forecasts are more optimistic than those of unrelated analysts when mutual funds raise holding of shares. The empirical results reveal that affiliated analysts issue biased forecasts when mutual funds adjust their shares after one quarter of offering, which suggests affiliated analysts may collaborate with mutual funds to get higher fund return.
