反敵意接管策略之法律研究; Legal Study of Anti-takeover Defenses

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題名:	反敵意接管策略之法律研究;Legal Study of Anti-takeover Defenses
作者:	蔣婉萍;Wan-Ping Chiang
貢獻者:	產業經濟研究所
關鍵詞:	併購;控制權移轉;資產鎖死選擇權;完全公平分析;兩角檢驗方式;雙重等級股票再資本化;間隔董事任期條款;鯊魚防護網;公開收購;敵意接管;merger & acquisition;hostile takeover;tender over;shark repellents;staggered board provision;control of change;asset lock-up option;entire fairness analysis;two-prong test;dual class stock recapitalization
日期:	2004-05-28
上傳時間:	2009-09-22 15:08:48 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學圖書館
摘要:	在現今的商業活動中，由於敵意接管活動愈趨鼎盛，所以，相對地目標公司管理階層所發展出來的反敵意接管策略即日新月異。因此，本文的重心係在於，研究目標公司董事會在面對敵意威脅時，其所採取之反敵意接管措施係如何運作，並且，就法律規範而言，這些措施是否皆係合法且正當。首先，本文於序章中，即大致上說明研究動機、目的、範圍、方法等，接著，便於第二章中簡介美國與我國的敵意接管策略。再來，第三章即探討目標公司管理階層是否得以採取反敵意接管措施，其防禦行為對於股東財富所產生之效果為何。在此，所用的方法係事前/事後的成本效益分析，去看反敵意接管策略對股東而言的成本效益為何。然後，則分別在第四、五章中去討論美國反敵意接管策略之應用與規範限制；在第六、七章中去討論我國反敵意接管之應用與規範限制。之後，於第八章中作出比較分析，並且，更進一步去探討美國所盛行的反敵意接管措施於我國現行法制下，是否得以適用。此外，還討論我國現行法制規範下，是否有所不足之處，並且，針對如何改進再提出些許建議。最後，才於第九章中作出總結。本文認為從法律經濟分析的角度來看，反敵意接管措施不一定會減損股東財富，反之，可能會增加股東財富。因此，目標公司管理階層基於信賴義務，須以股東利益為最大考量，所以，其管理階層即有權利，甚至，根本是有義務去採取反敵意接管措施，以對抗敵意接管者所提出不合理的收購威脅。再者，本文建議，我國目標公司管理階層可以借鏡美國行之有年的反敵意接管策略。原因係在於，美國目標公司管理階層所採用的反敵意接管策略中，有不少防禦策略係相當保護目標公司股東，所以，相當值得我國目標公司管理階層去加以學習。除此之外，我國現行法制下，對於董事會應負之信賴義務審查標準尚不明確，並且，關於交叉持股、委託書競賽、庫藏股制度仍是存在著相當大的問題，值得我國立法者去設法補強。 In the modern commercial activities, the merger and acquisition activities become more and more prosperous, therefore, the anti-takeover defenses relatively change with every passing day so much. As a result, this paper makes a study of that, when the target company faces a hostile takeover threat, whether the management should take anti-takeover defenses, how these anti-takeover defenses that the management uses are all reasonable and appropriate. The first charter explains the motive, purpose, range, and method of this paper in substance. Next, the second charter introduces the applicable anti-takeover defenses in American and Taiwan. Furthermore, the third charter promptly discusses that, whether the management should take an anti-takeover defense when they meet the hostile offer threat, even, before the threat happens. So, this charter is just put the stress on that, how these anti-takeover defenses affect shareholder wealth. Here, the method of this paper is the “Ex Post/Ex Ante Cost Benefit Analysis.” Then, the fourth and fifth charter respectively discuss about the available anti-takeover defenses and the regulation of the anti-takeover defenses in American. Similarly, the sixth and seventh charter discuss about the same problems in Taiwan. Afterwards, the eighth charter makes the comparable analysis about applicable anti-takeover defenses between American and Taiwan. Further, this charter confers the central problem that whether those popular anti-takeover defense in American can be used in Taiwan. Besides, this charter discusses about some shortcomings in Taiwan legal system, and also it provides some suggestions for these flaws. Eventually, the ninth makes the conclusion of this paper. This paper concludes that, ex ante the anti-takeover defense may not decrease shareholder wealth, even, perhaps increase shareholder wealth. Hence, the management should act for shareholder interest on basis of the fiduciary duty. That is, the management not only has equity to take anti-takeover defenses, but also has liability to take anti-takeover defense to protect shareholders from the inappropriate offer threat.
顯示於類別:	[產業經濟研究所] 博碩士論文

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