| 摘要: | 為促進兩岸銀行穩健經營及兩岸銀行體系之穩定，建構金融安全網為政府的重要政策，存保制度則為金融安全網建置的重要內涵之一。本論文以文獻回顧及個案分析之方法，先探討實施存保制度所可能招致之負面現象、其因應對策及健全之存保制度應具備的特性與處理失敗銀行之原則；其次，分析國際金融組織所提有關存保制度及處理失敗銀行之建議；隨後，彙整兩岸存保制度之現況及處理問題銀行之措施，分析目前大陸隱性存保制度之缺點，並比較兩岸存保制度之差易；總結以對未來兩岸存保制度之研訂、實施及修調所面臨的挑戰建議因應對策。 本論文第1章說明研究背景及動機、研究目的、研究方法及步驟，第2章闡述金融安全網之建置內涵，簡述兩岸之金融監理制度及最後融通者制度，第3章以國際金融組織所提有關存保制度及處理失敗銀行之建議為準則，探討存保制度實施可能招致之逆選擇、道德風險及代理問題等負面現象、因應對策及健全存保制度所應具備之特性與處理失敗銀行之原則，第4章擇要說明兩岸存保制度之運作現況及處理問題銀行之措施，並分析大陸隱性存保制度之缺點及比較兩岸存保制度之差易，第5章為結論，就兩岸存保制度之研訂、實施及修訂提供建議，其中，對臺灣存保制度之建議係參酌美國存保制度而得，第6章為對兩岸存保制度後續相關研究之建議。 本論文之結論為： 1. 對臺灣實施存保制度之建議 （1.1）維持中央存保公司之股份有限公司組織型態，但需突顯公益性、獨立性及專業性，並立法排除適用與存保制度設置目的及該公司任務不相容之規定，（1.2）應賦予中央存保公司對要保機構之金融檢查權及處分權，增加該公司可選擇之處理措施，充分授權其得迅速採行必要處理措施，賦予該公司所屬人員免責權而得豁免其訴訟及賠償責任，導入立即糾正措施及過渡銀行制度，（1.3）在金控公司對中央存保公司承保風險之影響方面，應正視金控公司與其銀行子公司間之業務及財務往來緊密，彼此利害相依的現實狀況，並將金控公司列為得提供財務協助之對象，（1.4）應充實存保基金規模，維持存保基金之安全存量，適度提高存保費率、增加保費分級與級距，並由國庫於中央存保公司向央行申請特別融資時提供擔保，且允許該公司發行經政府保證之金融債券，（1.5）農漁會信用部之經營風險偏高，應分設普通銀行存保基金及農漁會信用部存保基金，（1.6）應建立處理系統性銀行之彈性處理機制。 2. 對大陸建立存保制度之建議 大陸有建立顯性存保制度之必要，理由為（2.1）顯性存保制度所招致之道德風險較隱性存保制度所致者為低，（2.2）建立顯性存保制度可降低政府財政負擔，（2.3）建立顯性存保制度可確保中國人民銀行實施貨幣政策之有效性及獨立性，（2.4）建立顯性存保制度可使存款債務之清償及問題銀行之處理模式制度化，（2.5）建立顯性存保制度有益於四大國銀與政府信用分離，降低中央政府干預其業務經營之程度，（2.6）建立顯性存保制度有利於建構四大國銀及中小型銀行公平競爭之環境，（2.7）建立顯性存保制度有利於大陸銀行產業之國際化，（2.8）利率市場化有待輔以顯性存保制度。 大陸政府於建立顯性存保制度時，宜兼顧（2.1）改善中央及地方政府干預銀行業務經營及退場之情形，（2.2）健全金融監理制度、銀行評等機制、銀行危機預警機制及資訊揭露制度，（2.3）提升銀行及公眾之風險意識及對顯性存保制度之認識，（2.4）建構完備之問題銀行處理及退場機制，（2.5）健全社會信用制度，從環境及制度防範及化解銀行風險。 For the purposes of promoting banks in Taiwan and in Mainland-China being safely and soundly operated and improving the stability of banking system in both territories, construction of a finance safety net and its excution are a major policy of government performance. Deposit insurance scheme is an important element in the financial safety net and has been chosen and studied as a main subject in this thesis. Methods of study include literature review and case analysis. Discussion on the possible negative phenomena due to the implementation of deposit insurance scheme is made. The characteristics of a sound deposit insurance scheme and the principles of bank-failure resolution are delineated. Then, suggestions from international finance organizations on deposit insurance scheme and bank-failure resolution are collected and analyzed. The present operational situation of deposit insurance scheme and measures of resolving problematic banks in Taiwan and in Mainland-China are studied. The shortcomings of the present scheme operated in Mainland-China and differences of the scheme between Taiwan and Mainland-China are compared. Finally, suggestions on establishment, implementation and adjustment for the respective scheme excuted in Taiwan and in Mainland-China will be made. Research background, motive, goal, and research method and steps have been outlined in the 1st chapter in this thesis. In the 2nd chapter, elements of a finance safety net, the system of finance supervision and of the lender of last resort in Taiwan and in Mainland-China have been introduced. Suggestions regarding to the deposit insurance scheme and the bank-failure resolution from international finance organizations are described in the 3rd chapter in order to study the negative phenomena including adverse selection, moral hazard, and agency problems due to the execution of deposit insurance scheme. The characteristics of a sound deposit insurance scheme and the principles of bank-failure resolution are also discussed. The present operational situation of a deposit insurance scheme, the measures used for resolving a problematic bank in Taiwan and in Mainland-China, and the shortcomings of the scheme in Mainland-China and differences of the scheme in Taiwan and that in Mainland-China have been illustrated in the 4th chapter. In the 5th chapter, suggestions on the establishment, implementation and adjustment of the scheme in Taiwan and in Mainland-China have been made as the conclusions of this thesis. Suggestions for improving the scheme in Taiwan are made with reference to that in US. In the last chapter, further researches related to the topics studied have been suggested. Conclusions in this thesis are: 1. Suggestions for adjusting the deposit insurance scheme in Taiwan (1.1) Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) should be conducted as a limited liability company, and manifest to public interest, independence, specialty, and exclude regulations which disaccord with the established goal of the scheme and the duty of CDIC, (1.2) CDIC should be authorized with a right to inspect insured institutes, to take disciplinary action against these institutes, to upgrade measures to resolve problematic banks chosen by CDIC, and to take essential measures. The personnel in CDIC should be authorized to exempt from lawsuit and responsibility of compensation. Prompt corrective actions and a mechanism of bridge bank should be introduced and excuted by CDIC, (1.3) Viewing on the influence of financial holding company (FHC) on the risk raised from CDIC’s insurance of banks, the situation that FHC’s business and financial connections are closely related with banking subsidiary should be anticipated and, thus, FHC should allow to receive the financial assistance, (1.4) Full scale of deposit insurance fund and a securable storage of the fund should be maintained. It is necessary to increase properly premium rate, number of categories and the range for premium of each category, to state treasury guarantee to the finance applied by CDIC to central bank, and to allow CDIC to issue bonds guaranteed by government, (1.5) Operational risk of credit department in farmers’ or fishers’ associations is higher than that in banks. A single deposit insurance fund should be divided into fund of credit department and fund of other banks, (1.6) A mechanism being able to flexibly deal with a systemic baking crisis should be established. 2. Suggestions for establishing the deposit insurance scheme in Mainland-China Mainland-China government has necessity of establishing an explicit deposit insurance scheme. The reasons are (2.1) Moral hazard incurred from an explicit scheme is lower than that from an implicit scheme, (2.2) A explicit scheme can reduce the fiscal finance burden of government, (2.3) An explicit scheme can maintain the independence and effectiveness of monetary policy implemented by the China People's Bank, (2.4) An explicit scheme can institutionalize the payoff of deposit debts and the resolution of problematic banks, (2.5) An explicit scheme is helpful to separate four state-owned banks from the government credit, and also to reduce intervention in these banks from central government, (2.6) An explicit scheme can promote the fair competition among four state-owned banks and the middle or small scale banks, (2.7) An explicit scheme favors the internationalization of banking industry of Mainland-China, (2.8) Deregulation of interest rate should cooperate with an explicit scheme. In order to avert and resolve banking crisis, Mainland-China government, apart from establishing explicit scheme, should take account of (2.1) improving the situation that the central and local governments intervene banks business and exit, (2.2) reinforcing mechanisms of financial supervision, banks rating, early warning of bank crisis and information disclosure, (2.3) promoting risk-awareness and understanding of the explicit deposit insurance scheme from both the banks and the public, (2.4) constructing a complete mechanism for resolving problematic banks and their exiting, and (2.5) establishing a better and healthy society credit system. |
