本篇論文是探討全民健保實施後，支付制度從論量計酬至總額支付制度，醫院市場高科技醫療儀器之數量與市場競爭程度的關聯。本研究利用「民國84至93年底台灣地區公私立醫院昂貴或具危險性醫療儀器使用台數」裡提供的電腦斷層掃描器、放射性同位素設備(放射性同位素治療和放射性同位素診斷設備的加總)、高能粒子治療設備、核磁共振斷層掃瞄器與高震波腎臟碎石機的使用數量為被解釋變數，另以三大變數「市場競爭變數」、「總額支付制度之時間虛擬變數」、「市場供需變數」作為解釋變數，以醫院為觀察單位進行固定效果負二項分配迴歸分析。 本研究的實證結果發現全民健保總額支付制度實施後，高能粒子治療設備和高震波腎臟碎石機的數量隨著市場越競爭而減少，即這兩種儀器在總額支付制度實施後，醫療競武的影響有所減緩並達到我們的預期。不過仍有三種儀器的數量並未因為總額支付制度的實施，和市場競爭程度呈現顯著性的正相關。由於本研究所採用總額支付制度實施後的觀察年度才兩年半，樣本數不足夠反映出總額支付制度市場集中度的變化和高科技醫療儀器的變化的關聯性，以致只有部份儀器的實證結果顯示醫療競武之影響有所減緩。於此，我們預期隨著總額支付制度實施的期間越長，對醫療競武的影響將會越顯著。 This paper is to empirically examine the effects of global budgeting on medical arms race phenomena and its relationship with the market structure. More specifically, with the implementation of global budget, we test the possibility whether the more competitive the hospital’s market, the greater degree to which it has had to lower the acquisition of hi-tech medical equipment. Using a fixed effects negative binomial regression model based on a panel of hospitals in Taiwan for the period 1995-2004, we find that the number of two kinds of hi-tech medical equipment that a hospital has after global budgeting was initiated is negatively in relation to the degree of market competition and these results attain our expectation. However the number of the rest three kinds of hi-tech medical equipment is not. These results also suggest that we can expect along with the longer period of implementation of global budget, medical arms race phenomena will be lowered further.
