本論文建立一個垂直相關市場的理論模型，討論存在中間財市場下，最終財廠商的創新程度為非劇烈創新與劇烈創新下的授權問題。當存在中間財市場且最終財廠商的創新程度為非劇烈創新時，我們發現不同的授權方式並不會影響中間財的價格。然而，當創新程度為劇烈創新時，最終財廠商授權將使得均衡的中間財價格會低於廠商不授權下的中間財價格。值得注意的是，在考慮中間財市場下，當創新程度為劇烈創新時，技術領先廠商可能將技術授權給技術落後廠商。此一結論打破了過去授權文獻認為創新程度為劇烈創新時，廠商一定不會授權的結論。 This paper establishes a vertical-related model which both considers intermediate goods and final goods, and discusses the licensing issue under two situations: the innovation of the final good firm is non-drastic or drastic. Under the model which considers both the intermediate goods and the final goods, we find that no matter royalty or fixed fees licensing will not affect the intermediate goods’ price if the final good’s firm is non-drastic innovation firm. However, when the final good’s firm is a drastic innovation firm, the equilibrium intermediate goods’ price under licensing would be higher than that under non-licensing. Besides, we have to notice that, when the final good’s firm has drastic innovation, licensing could still occur under the vertical-related model. This point is different from the past licensing literatures’ conclusion: when the final good’s firm has drastic innovation, licensing never occurs.