本篇研究主要在探討網路拍賣中，不同的資訊不對稱程度下，起始價格和賣方聲譽之間的交互作用對於結標價格的影響。研究結果指出，在高資訊不對稱時，這兩個外部線索的一致，將會導致賣方獲利的提高，然而在低資訊不對稱時並無顯著的影響。線索一致理論以及線索利用理論被用來解釋這種形情。而拍賣的成功率在本篇研究也有被討論，結果指出，在高資訊不對稱的時候，賣方聲譽將會顯著的提升拍賣的成功率。總之，本篇研究發現，在低資訊不對稱的情況下，賣方聲譽對拍賣結果並不會有顯著的影響。在高資訊不對稱的情況下，高聲譽的賣家可以設定高的起始價格以提高結標價格以及拍賣成功率。 This study examined the interactive effect of starting price and seller’s reputation on final price and the probability of auction success under different information asymmetry levels in online consumer-to-consumer auction. As these two extrinsic cues are consistent under high information asymmetry, seller earnings increase. However, the influence of the cue consistency on the final price is not observed under low information asymmetry. Both the cue consistency theory and cue-utilization theory explain this condition. The probability of auction success is also evaluated and, higher seller’s reputation positively impacts the probability of auction success under high information asymmetry. In summary, these findings suggest that seller’s reputation will not influence the results of auctions significantly under low information asymmetry. Under high information asymmetry sellers receive greater earnings as well as high probability of auction success by setting high starting price when seller’s reputation is high.
