科技的進展與經濟的發展，使得市場預測更加困難，需求資訊變化程度也愈來愈快，各企業更加難以生存。故本文研究供應鏈成員間資訊共享的協調問題，來分析並解決損耗品供應鏈的資訊不對稱的方法。 內文採取單一製造商與零售商進行斯達貝克賽局的二級供應鏈模型，來研究在此供應鏈下製造商與零售商的最佳決策及其收益。透過資訊是否共享，先分析零售商是否會無償提供資訊。透過研究發現無償資訊共享能夠提高製造商的績效，但卻會降低零售商與供應鏈整體的績效。故零售商不會共享其私有資訊，造成整個供應鏈的資訊不對稱。而製造商為了解決資訊不對稱的續效降低問題，透過了機制的設計來促使零售商願意分享資訊於供應商，使其提高本身利潤，供應鏈利潤，並協調供應鏈。 最後，在三種機制中，得出線性與非線性的價格折扣機制能夠在條件限制下協調供應鏈的結論。而在這二種機制都能達到目的下，再分析製造商與零售商於市場中的動作。而最後透過比較分析的結果，得到雖然均能達到資訊共享與供應鏈協調的結果，但線性數量價格折扣中，製造商得付出更多的資訊成本，但是供應鏈整體績效有較大的提高，而如果選擇非線性數量價格折扣中，能保證製造商的市場利潤最高。故從這二個方面來探討製造商該如何選擇機制。 Progress of technology and development of economy make market prediction more difficult, the change intensity of demand information is quicker and quicker, every enterprise is more difficult to survive. So this paper is studied supplies with the coordination problem of the information sharing among chain members to analyze and solve information asymmetry of the perishable supply chain. The paper takes single manufacturer and retailer to go on a two-echelon supply chain model, to study best decision and income of one manufacturer and retailer under this supply chain. According to information sharing, it analyzes whether a retailer will offer free information first. The manufacturer’s performance will improve by the free information sharing, but we all find out that free information sharing will bring down the market performance of supply chain. So the retailer will not share the information for free. The manufacturer in order to solve the result and reducing the problem of information asymmetry, it excepts that the retailer will like to share information to the supplier by mechanism design and make it raise his own profit, supply chain profit, and coordinate and supply the chain. Finally, in three kinds of mechanisms, linear and non-linear price quantity discount mechanism can coordinate to supply chain. Under the circumstances, these two kinds of mechanisms can both achieve the goal, and then analyze the manufacturer and the retailer movements in the market. And through the result of comparative analysis finally, getting though can reach information to share with the result of supplying chain coordination. In the linear quantity price discount, the manufacturer must pay more information cost, but it is efficiency mechanism; and if the manufacturer chooses the non-linear quantity price discount, it can guarantee the highest market profits of the manufacturer. So from these two respects discusses how manufacturers should be chosen mechanisms.
