| 摘要: | 國家經濟管制中，競爭者訴訟為典型第三人權利救濟之一種，若認為自身權利或利益受到影響，競爭者如何以第三人地位提起訴訟，得以進入實體審查的門檻的判斷，在我國與美國都成為運用法院救濟之重點，因此本文旨在研究我國行政訴訟中訴訟權能理論，並以美國法原告適格之理論為比較分析觀點，檢視我國與美國在第三人以競爭者地位起訴時，起訴資格之判斷有何不同，並以此為我國法制不足之借鏡。 從美國面向看來，原告適格理論從早期私權模式發展至今以事實上損害與利益領域二階段判斷，在事實上損害階段，先認定起訴之人因行政行為有造成具體、迫切的損害，再於利益領域階層考量原告是否為法規範所保護的對象。而我國之訴訟權能理論，幾乎完全以原告之法律上權利或利益來判斷，形成了新保護規範理論獨大的局面。尤其是新保護規範理論係以客觀意旨探究，看似為適用彈性極大之理論，但從實務經驗看來，在經濟管制中競爭者具備訴訟權能之案件卻屈指可數。又保護規範理論在第三人保護的情況，尚不足以確實掌握損害的實際情狀和連結關係。若遇無法規範依據或法規範無法導引出原告之主觀公權利時，將形成競爭者確實受到損害卻無從起訴之情況。 茲此，本文就我國訴訟權能與美國原告適格之觀察做出結論，認為在法院判斷訴訟權能時，若從特定法律規範難以檢視當事人主觀公權利時，於進入保護規範理論判斷之前，可加入事實上損害和因果關係的考量，讓真正受到違法行政行為損害之人有救濟的管道。此外，若人民確實有受到損害時，則不能排除在特殊情況下從基本權獲得主觀公權利之可能性，可由法院加入合於基本權解釋的方法，讓人民具有法規所保護之利益。 This thesis concentrates on standing to sue doctrine of the third party as a competitor, whose interests are adversely affected by an administrative action under the economic regulation, through a comparative vision between Taiwan and United States. An agency action might influence both directly regulated parties and indirectly regulated third parties. In order to invoke the courts’ power to review a government action, a person must establish standing to challenge that. However, it is slippery for courts to identify whether a third party, a competitor towards the direct regulated party, has standing to sue when he alleges his interests are affected by the administrative action. In Taiwan, the administrative courts review if a party has standing to sue mainly by “theory of protective norm”. That is, legal rights or legal interests of a competitor are statutorily protected through the objective interpretation of relevant statutes by the courts. It seems like a tremendous flexible and extremely broad doctrine.theless, in practice, the courts have continuously held that the economic interests and competitive injury of the litigant are not entitled to bring an action because those are not legally protected. In United States, according to the Administrative Procedure Act, a person whose interests are adversely affected or aggrieved by any decision are able to challenge the official action. Courts address the “injury in fact” test, the constitutional requirement, and the “zone of interests” test, the prudential requirement, to identify the standing of a litigant. To satisfy these two requirements of standing, the competitor must allege a direct personal injury which is fairly traceable to the defendant's action, likely to be redressed and his complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. In conclusion, to base on the previous analysis and comparison, using theory of protective norm in a rigid way is not sufficient to determine whether the litigant has enforceable right or interests to against competitive injury in Taiwan. Therefore, this thesis attempts to propose several supplements when courts apply the theory. |
