董事會結構與自願性財務預測之關聯性; The Association between Boards Structure and the Properties of Management Voluntary Earnings Forecasts

NCUIR > School of Management at National Central University > Executive Master of Business Administration > Electronic Thesis & Dissertation > Item 987654321/48744

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Title:	董事會結構與自願性財務預測之關聯性;The Association between Boards Structure and the Properties of Management Voluntary Earnings Forecasts
Authors:	陳美華;Mei-Hua Chen
Contributors:	企業管理學系碩士在職專班
Keywords:	自願性財務預測;董事會結構;Boards Structure;Management voluntary earnings forecasts
Date:	2011-07-27
Issue Date:	2012-01-05 15:05:31 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本研究探討董事會結構與自願性財務預測的關聯性。係以台灣上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，資料來源取自TEJ資料庫，研究期間自2005至 2007年止，共計 3年。本文之研究方法採用邏輯斯迴歸、普瓦松迴歸及一般多元迴歸，主要目的在於檢測董事會結構對自願性財務預測揭露意願及品質之影響，我們以是否揭露及揭露次數來衡量自願性財務預測揭露意願，以預測誤差及樂觀性來衡量自願性財務預測品質，另外以(1)董事長兼總經理; (2)董事會規模; (3)內部董事席次比率(4)外部董事持股比率來衡量董事會結構。　　董事會結構對自願性財務預測揭露意願之實證結果發現 (1) 董事長兼總經理對於自願性財務預測揭露意願呈負相關但不顯著； (2) 董事會規模對於自願性財務預測揭露意願呈顯著正相關； (3) 內部董事席次比率對於自願性財務預測揭露意願呈顯著負相關，(4) 外部董事持股比率對於自願性財務預測揭露意願呈顯著正相關，另外董事會結構對自願性財務預測品質之實證結果發現(1) 董事長兼總經理對於自願性財務預測預測品質皆不顯著; (2) 董事會規模對於自願性財務預測品質亦皆不顯著; (3) 內部董事席次比率對於自願性財務預測呈顯著負相關即準確度較高，且較保守; (4) 外部董事持股比率對於自願性財務預測品質皆不顯著。　　This research investigates the association between boards structure and voluntary earnings forecasts. The samples are selected from companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange. I obtain boards structure & the properties of management voluntary earnings forecasts data from the TEJ database. The data covers the period from 2005 to 2007, total 3 years. I use the Logistic, Poisson & OLS regressions analyses as methodology here. The purposes of this paper are a) investigate whether firms expose earnings forecasts or not and the exposition frequencies will impact the voluntary earnings forecasts or not? b) investigate whether forecast accuracy & bias will impact the quality of voluntary earnings forecasts or not? We use 4 main variables to weigh the boards structure. (1) Chairman concurrently general manager; (2) board size; (3) inside directors seat ratio (4) outside directors own stocks ratio. 　　We find that the boards structure to the voluntary earnings forecasts exposition will (1) Firms with chairman concurrently general manager are less likely to issue the voluntary earnings forecasts, but non conspicuousness; (2) Firms with greater board size are more likely to issue the voluntary earnings forecasts and conspicuousness; (3) Firms with a greater percentage of inside directors seat ratio are less likely to issue the voluntary earnings forecasts, but conspicuousness; (4) Firms with a greater percentage of outside directors own stocks ratio are more likely to issue the voluntary earnings forecasts and conspicuousness。 In addition, we find the boards structure to the voluntary earnings forecasts quality (1) Firms with chairman concurrently general manager are non conspicuousness; (2) Firms with greater board size are non conspicuousness; (3) Firms with a greater percentage of inside directors seat ratio are more accurate and less optimistically; (4) Firms with a greater percentage of outside directors own stocks ratio are non conspicuousness.
Appears in Collections:	[Executive Master of Business Administration] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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