本論文探討二個與公司治理和公司支付政策相關之議題，其一為公司治理與高階主管股票選擇權對股利支付之影響，另一為公司治理對公司支付政策之影響。 有關第一篇文章，探討公司治理與高階主管股票選擇權對股利支付之影響。實證發現，股利支付與公司治理呈負相關，隱含公司治理較強之公司其潛在代理問題較小，故透過股利降低代理問題之動機較低。另一方面，股利支付與高階主管股票選擇權亦呈負相關，因在美國高階主管股票選擇權一般不受股利保護，股利支付將降低股票選擇權的價值，故股票選擇權將使高階主管有降低股利支付之動機。最後，發現公司治理的強弱會影響股利支付與高階主管股票選擇權之關係。公司治理較強與公司治理較弱之公司，股利支付與高階主管股票選擇權之關係反轉為正相關，而一般公司治理之公司，股利支付與高階主管股票選擇權乃為負相關。即，股利支付與公司治理和高階主管股票選擇權之間呈非線性關係。 第二篇文章，探討公司治理對公司支付政策之影響。實證發現，公司治理顯著影響公司之支付組合，且股利支付與股票購回之間呈替代關係。在公司治理較強與公司治理較弱公司，傾向增加股利支付並減少股票購回，相反地，一般公司治理公司則傾向增加股票購回並減少股利支付。公司治理對公司支付組合之影響呈非線性關係。 This paper examines two eassys on corporate governance and corporate payout policy. One for corporate governance and executive stock options influenced on dividend payout, and the other for corporate governance influenced on payout policy. In the first essay, we examine the influences of the corporate governance and executive stock options on dividend payout. The evidence shows a negative association between dividend payout and corporate governance. This implies that the firms with strong governance suffer less potential agency problems than other types of firms, so the motivation of dividend payout to mitigate the agency problem is low. The evidence also demonstrates a negative association between dividend payout and executive stock options. It is due to the fact that the executive stock options are not generally dividend-protected in the U.S. and thus the dividend payout will decrease the value of stock options to manager. As a consequence, the executive stock options provide manager an incentive to lower dividend payout. Finally, the evidence shows the quality (strength) of corporate governance will affect the relationship between dividend payout and executive stock options. The firms with strong governance and weak governance have positive association between dividend payout and executive stock options, while the firms with moderate governance have negative association between dividend payout and executive stock options. That is, our evidence reveals a non-linear association between dividend payout, corporate governance and executive stock options. In the seoncd essay, we examine the influences of the corporate governance on corporate payout policy. The evidence shows a significant association between corporate governance and payout policy, and a substitution relationship between dividned and stock repurchase. The firms with strong governance and weak governance tend to increase dividends and reduce stock repurchases, while the firms with moderate governance tend to increase stock repurchases and reduce dividends. That is, our evidence reveals a non-linear association between corporate governance and payout policy.
