| 摘要: | 本論文利用經濟分析的方法來探討政府的教育政策對於大學教育的影響。我們首先探討政府對學校教育所應採取的最適學費及補貼政策及學校最適的班級數目。其次，我們檢視政府對大學的教育補貼如何影響大學訂定的畢業標準、招生人數及平均學生稟賦。此外，我們也關心政府縮減大學間的學費差距對於大學表現的影響。最後，有鑑於近年來各國政府對於學生品格教育的重視及投入，我們建立一個理論模型分析大學的品格教育投入對於大學教學與研究資源分配的影響以及探討政府的最適品格教育補貼。本論文分別就這三個議題來分析討論。我們得到的結論如下。 （一）就政府對大學的最適學費與補貼政策而言，當政府的目標是同時關心學生的表現及學校的表現，而學校的目標則為學生表現與其利潤的加權平均時，本論文第二章發現當政府相對較關心學生表現時，若學校亦較重視學生的表現時，政府就應降低學生學費且減少對學校的補貼；當政府重視學生表現的程度更高時，則政府除了應讓學校收取的學費降低之外，還應增加對學校的補貼。 （二）就政府縮減學費差距對於學校表現的影響而言，若大學的目標在於追求研究與教學的整體表現，且大學可以藉由控制招生人數以及畢業標準，將大學經費分配於教學與研究以提升其總體表現。本論文第三章假設大學之間的學費與政府對二所大學的補貼可能不相等下，探討大學招生人數與畢業標準應該如何訂定以極大化大學的總體表現，並探討學費差距的變化對於大學整體表現的影響。本章發現不論大學重視研究的程度如何，收取較高學費的大學會訂定較高的學生畢業標準。政府對於大學的固定補貼並不會影響二所大學訂定的畢業標準、招生人數或是平均學生稟賦。其次，當政府對二所大學的補助相近時，若大學較重視研究，則低學費大學整體表現將會較高學費大學為優；然而，若大學較不重視研究，則高學費大學整體表現將會較優。最後，本章發現縮小學費差距可以縮小兩大學整體表現的差距，但卻會使原本表現較佳的大學的整體表現變差。 （三）就品格教育而言，我們發現學生原始品行愈差，會使大學的教學投入愈少、品格教育投入愈多。本論文第四章的討論中亦發現：若學生的品性不會影響教學的邊際產出，當學生原始品性愈差時，大學對於研究的投入會愈少；若學生的不良品性會降低教學的邊際產出時，當學生品性愈差時，則大學用於研究的資源可能會增加。其次，若政府提高對於大學的品格教育補貼，則大學用於教學與品格教育的資源會提高，但大學品格教育的實際支出卻會下降且大學研究投入不一定會提高。最後，本章發現政府極大化社會福利下的品格教育補貼會等於學生不良品性對於社會的邊際損害。 We use the economics analytical method to discuss how the government’s educational policies affect the universities performance. We first discuss the government’s optimal tuition fee and optimal educational subsidies. And then, we also discuss how these two educational policies change when the university’s or the government’s emphasis on students’ performance changes. Secondly, we explore how student enrollment numbers and graduation standards can be employed to maximize university’s overall performance. We also explore the impact of lowering student tuitions differential upon this overall performance. Thirdly, we establish a theoretical model to analyze the optimal resources distribution of the university when the university must put its resources in teaching, research, and students’ characteristic education. In this issue, we also explore what is the government’s optimal characteristic educational subsidy policy. About the first topic, we assume a government simultaneously cares about students’ performance and university’s managerial objectives, while university’s objective includes student performance and its profit. In the two-stage game structure, we find that the university’s optimal number of classes increases with the government’s subsidies, and decreases with tuition fees. We also find that when the government puts more emphasis on students’ performance, it should increase subsidies and reduce tuition fees. When the university cares more about the student performance, the government should reduce tuition fees as well as subsidies. About the second topic, we find that regardless of the degree a university stresses research, the university with higher tuition fee establishes higher graduation standards. Fixed governmental subsidy do not affect the establishment of university graduation standards, and the enroll standard of intellectual endowment. Secondly, when governmental subsidies are equivalent between two universities, and the universities that stress research more, the university which charge lower tuition that tend to have superior overall performance. However, when universities do not stress research, the university which charge higher tuition tends to have a superior overall performance. Lastly, a lower differential on tuition between universities also reduces the overall performance differential of the universities; nevertheless the tendency remains that universities which formerly enjoyed good overall performance tend to perform more poorly. As to the university’s characteristic education, we find that the university must put more resources for the students’ characteristic education and put fewer resources for teaching when the students’ initial character is worse. The change of resources for university’s research will be booked on the basis that whether the student’s character influences teaching when the students’ character is worse. Secondly when the government’s characteristic subsidies increases, the university will put more resources for characteristic education and teaching, but the real expenditure of characteristic education is reduced. Lastly, we find the government’s optimal characteristic subsidies equal to the marginal damages that student's character causes to the society. |
