我國資本市場的動能來源為1990年代民間儲蓄釋放到股票市場，自此我國企業開始從資本市場募集資金帶往中國大陸投資，使我國資本市場動能越來越弱。本文採用個案研究法，以本國某借殼上市公司為例，以了解本土企業與外資合作上市的目的、成效與結果，並發現外資借殼上市對於公司治理所造成的影響。 本文以2003年個案公司前後財務分析比率做為其借殼上市前後的差異比較，並與6家外資申請上市公司的財務分析比率進行對照。透過財務結構、償債能力與現金流量做為公司治理變化的指標，以了解企業資金流向；以經營能力、獲利能力做為代理績效變化的指標，以了解經營成效。 個案公司財務比率分析顯示，公司治理指標僅負債占資產比率與現金流量允當比率2項增強，但有6項指標減弱，代表借殼公司以短期資金代替長期資金，已不顧及股東長期利益。代理績效在12項的檢測比例中，增強的部份有5項，而逐漸減弱有7項，代表借殼上市公司之管理經營績效高過之前，但獲利績效卻減弱。 由於本國法令的改變使外資對我國的資本市場重新定義，本研究結論如下： 1. 我國對中國匯款限制取消降低了外資在台借殼上市誘因。 2. 鼓勵外資在台申請上市，其誘因仍繫於大陸市場，等待在中國上市時機。 3. 資本流動的性質左右企業戰略方向，對公司治理與代理績效具有影響力。 4. 借殼上市無法促進我國經濟成長，後續下市櫃問題，影響股東權益甚鉅。 基於結論本文建議如下： 1. 修訂強制集保制度，明確股份有限公司不能以契約交易股權。 2. 對國外借殼上市之企業，應進行政府單位現場監理，費用由該企業支付。 3. 政府應扶植外資促進資本流動，杜絕借殼上市的現象。 4. 為強化我國資本市場，讓資本流動對公司治理與代理績效有益，政府不能自絕於亞洲資本市場之外。 Foreign investments in Taiwan can facilitate our national development and. Al-though foreign investments can stimulate the economy, such investments may also cause economic overheating and other negative effects. The reason is that some for-eign investing companies may take the advantage of backdoor listing and capital im-mobility. Recently, China economy is growing rapidly, but it has complex and rigorous re-strictions on foreign investment. Some foreign investing companies, thus, have tries to invest in China through Taiwan’s companies because China provides some privileges only to Taiwan’s companies. Under such circumstances, foreign investing companies attempt to control Taiwan’s companies and back-door listing in order to obtain the right of capital mobility and then invest in China indirectly. However, back-door list-ing may cause negative effects on corporate governance. It is a critical problem in Taiwan. This study focuses on understanding the impact of back-door listing on corporate governance. Using financial analysis, we compare the financial indexes of a back-door listing company and those of other six foreign capital listing companies. The results show the back-door listing company has relatively poor performance and corporate governance. Our main research findings are as follows: The incentive of back-door listing has decreased after Taiwan’s government canceled the restrictions on capital mobility to China. The incentive of foreign companies to become the listing companies in Taiwan depends on China’s policies and investment opportunities. Capital mobility can impact a firm’s strategies, corporate governance and agency performance. Back-door listing cannot facilitate economy growth in Taiwan and has negative effects on stockholders. The followings are the suggestions and implications of the research: Taiwan’s government should amend the laws of stock depository and prescribe that the stocks of the Stock Limited Corporation cannot exchange through contracts. The government should monitor and audit back-door listing companies, and the costs should be paid by such companies. The government should facilitate proper foreign capital mobility and prevent back-door listing. The government should let Taiwan’s capital market more involve in Asia capital market in order to enhance Taiwan’s capital market with suitable capital mobility that can help companies build proper corporate governance and achieve greater agency performance.
