| 摘要: | 本研究旨在探討家族所有權對短視的研發投資行為(第一年研究計畫)與審計品質的影響(第二年研究計畫)。短視的研發投資行為是指經理人透過削減研發投資以達短期的盈餘目標。代理理論的文獻顯示，短視的研發投資行為與審計品質主要決定於代理問題的嚴重性，因此，透過本研究，我們可以檢視家族企業的代理問題是否大於(小於)非家族企業。我們預期，家族所有權透過其誘因效果與權力鞏固效果影響短視研發投資行為與審計品質，因此，家族所有權對短視研發投資行為與審計品質決定於上述兩種效果何者較強。第一年與第二年的研究計畫對家族企業的文獻具有貢獻，近年來以美國為樣本的研究大多支持家族企業的代理問題較小。東南亞國家與美國制度背景不同，以東南亞國家為樣本的研究大多顯示，家族企業的代理問題大於非家族企業。透過本研究，我們可以進一步釐清，對於公司治理與法律環境較差的東南亞國家，例如台灣，家族企業是否仍然為一較有效率的組織型態。第一年的研究計畫對於短視投資行為的文獻具有兩個貢獻。第一、過去短視投資行為的文獻多以美國為樣本，本研究可以證實美國以外的國家，例如台灣，是否也存有短視的投資行為。第二、過去短視行為的文獻發現，透過增加內部人與機構投資人持股、以及使用研發基礎的獎酬計畫，可以緩和經理人的短視投資行為。本研究指出，家族內部人所具備的特性，例如長期的持股、較重視聲譽、較能監督經理人以及擁有較多的內部資訊，也是緩和短視投資行為的機制之一。第二年的研究計畫對會計師選擇的文獻有兩個貢獻。第一、過去研究代理成本與審計品質關聯性的文獻多由的需求面探討代理成本對會計師選擇的影響，有別於過去的研究，我們同時探討並區別家族所有權對審計品質的需求面與供給面的影響。第二、代理理論預期，內部人持股與審計品質負相關，但是過去的文獻不完全支持代理理論的觀點。本研究指出，內部人持股多寡也許無法完全解釋內部人與會計師的選擇的關係，家族內部人所具備的特性，例如長期的持股、較重視聲譽、較能監督經理人以及擁有較多的內部資訊，較能解釋內部人對會計師選擇的影響。This study examines the impact of founding family ownership on myopic research and development (R&D) investment behavior (the first-year project) and audit quality (the second-year project). Myopic R&D investment behavior refers to a strategic underinvestment in R&D for the purposes of meeting short-term earnings goals. Agency theory suggests that the severity of agency problems is primarily responsible for myopia R&D investment behavior and audit quality; thus, we focus on myopia R&D investment behavior and audit quality to distinguish whether family firms exhibit more or less severe agency problems relative to nonfamily firms.We posit that family ownership affects myopia R&D investment behavior and audit quality in two competing ways: through an interest alignment effect and an entrenchment effect. Thus, the extent to which family ownership affects myopic R&D investment behavior depends on the net effect of these two competing forces. Our both first- and second-year projects contribute to the literature on family firms. Recent U.S.-based studies show that agency problems within U.S. family firms are less severe than agency problems within nonfamily firms (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2003b; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). However, recent studies within Asian countries (i.e., Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001; Lemmon and Lins, 2003) , which are commonly characterized by poor corporate governance and weak investor protection, provide evidence that family firms exhibit more severe agency problems relative to nonfamily firms due to their different institutional backgrounds. Our study complements this stream of literature by examining whether the family firm ownership structure, which is dominate in East Asian countries such as Taiwan, is a more or less effective organizational structure as compared to nonfamily firms. Our first-year project makes two contributions to the literature of myopia investment behavior. First, it reports the existence or nonexistence of myopic R&D investment behavior outside the United States. Second, prior literature of myopic investment behavior suggests that such behavior can be mitigated by higher insider and institutional ownership and R&D-based compensation schemes.We complement this literature by suggesting that the unique features of family firms, such as longer tenure, more concern over reputation, better monitoring of management, and better access to information, also play an important role in mitigating myopic investment behavior. Our second-year project contributes to the literature on auditor choice. First, although prior auditor choice studies focus on the impact of agency cost on the demand for audit quality, we contribute to the literature by identifying and separating the impact of agency cost from the demand and the supply of audit quality. Second, although studies focusing on the association management ownership and audit quality (e.g., Defond, 1992; Francis andWilson, 1988; Lennox, 2005) do not strongly support the predicted negative association between management ownership and audit quality, we add to this literature by suggesting that this negative association may be driven by family insiders rather than nonfamily insiders.We also argue that family insiders’ unique features such as better managerial oversight, better access to information, longer investment horizon, and more concern for reputation, rather than positions and substantial stocks, may account for this negative correlation. 研究期間：10008 ~ 10107 |
