製造商在生產過程中經常會產出不良品，但下游的買家卻往往因為無法得知其品質等相關參數，不只使得排程規劃難度增加，處理不良品的同時也產生額外支出。在本篇論文中，我們假設買家面對一生產品質未知的供應商，並欲決定購買的物料數量。為鼓勵供應商提供其真實的產品品質參數，我們設計一個採購機制，對於供應商宣稱的產品品質與實際品質之間的差異實行懲罰，並使提供真實資訊的供應商獲得最高的報酬。由此採購機制模型當中，我們得出若買家對於具有高低品質的供應商設定不同的訂購量，並使從高、低品質的供應商購買的數量符合一特定比例，則可達到獲取真實資訊的目的；一般而言，當供應商的品質為低時，若買家承諾訂購較多數量，則供應商將願意提供其真實的品質參數。此外，我們亦觀察到買家提出的購買價格、懲罰以及供應商的品質參數、生產成本以及是否為高或低品質的機率等等參數，皆會影響買方的利潤以及訂購量的決定。Defects often occur during production process. However, supply quality may be unknown and result in not only difficulties in production planning and forecasting but also extra costs for returning or scraping. In this study, we consider that the buyer is facing a supplier with unknown production quality and intends to determine the order quantity. We design a procurement mechanism which provides incentives for the supplier by applying penalty for difference between declared and true quality and maximizing the utility of revealing true attributes. We then concluded that the order quantity from the supplier with high or low quality must satisfy a certain ratio. Generally, if the buyer promises to order more items from the low-quality supplier, the supplier will admit true quality. Moreover, we observed that parameters such as the payment and penalty, supplier’s quality and production costs, and the probability of the supplier’s type would affect the optimal order quantity and objective function.
