近年來，由於全球的政經情勢詭侷多變，企業的經營環境面臨挑戰，因此公司治理凸顯其重要性，因此除了企業進行內部治理機制的改革外，也應加強外部監理的機制，以增強企業競爭力和應付各種風險的能力。 過去的文獻指出，內部人的持股比率反映出兩個公司內部與外部股東之間的代理問題，分別為利益一致性效果（Convergence-of-Interest）與利益鞏固效果（Managerial Entrenchment）。本研究以代理理論為研究基礎，馬來西亞上市公司為研究對象，利用公司內部人持股比率為代理變數，並將各持股分成三個區間進行持股門檻分析，即低持股(0~5%)、中持股(5~25%)及高持股(25~100%)進行分析。實證結果顯示，內部人持股中的董事會持股在低持股及高持股區間與審計品質之係數為負值並達顯著水準，故董事會持股的增加使利益一致性效果較為明顯，所以公司雇用高品質會計師事務所為公司進行審計工作的可能性會降低。而在中持股則因利益一致性效果與利益鞏固效果相互抵銷，呈現無相關的結果。因此本研究認為董事會的持股對公司在選擇會計師事務所是具有相關性的。According to the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), a controlling owner may introduce monitoring or bonding mechanisms that limit his or her ability to hold up minority shareholders and hence mitigate the agency conflict. How to manage the board of a company is the key point for corporate governance.It is an important issue if healthy board of director can achieve the goal of corporate governance. In this study, the agency theory as the research base in Malaysia listed companies,company insider as a proxy variable, and each holding is divided into three intervals. The empirical results show that insider , board of directors, holding a negative correlation between the low ownership and high shareholding, the convergence-of-Interest more than managerial entrenchment ,when the board of directors increase shareholding .The company is likely to choice high-quality CPA firm. In particular,the percentage of shares held by boards of directors are significantly negative relation to the selection of high quality auditors.
